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Abstract
My thesis aims to explore the relationship between public policies and vehicle driving
from three aspects.
First, we examine two policy options for the government to address pollution
externality caused by vehicle driving: gasoline taxes and clean vehicle subsidies
towards clean technology. We introduce vintage vehicles into our model to measure
the impact of policies on households’ vehicle driving choices. We show that all
policies are effective in reducing pollution and improving the environmental quality.
However, they have distinctively different distributional impact on the production
side and social welfare.
Second, we derive the optimal environmental tax structure in the presence of
externalities caused by vehicle driving in the first-best scenario. Analytical results
show that the optimal gasoline taxes are composed of two opposing factors and
depend on the household’s preferences for environmental factors. Our calibration
based on the U.S. economy shows that the optimal gasoline taxes should be higher
for old cars while the optimal road taxes should be higher for new cars.
Third, we formulate the optimal environmental tax structure in the presence of
iv
other distortionary taxes. We find that the optimal environmental taxes constitute
both the efficiency part and the Pigovian part. Optimal taxes depend not only on
the household’s preferences for the environmental factors but also on the degree of
complementarities with normal consumption goods.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Among all consumer products, few are regulated and taxed more broadly than vehi-
cles. Vehicle driving is the main stated reason for urban air pollution and congestion.
Vehicles are the main culprits of urban air pollution, especially in developing coun-
tries(Jha and Whalley, 2015). Poor air quality is a major global problem, with
outdoor air pollution causing more than 3.3 million annual premature deaths and
many more associated cases of illness (Gately et al., 2017). Mobile sources are re-
sponsible for a large fraction of air pollutant emissions in the United States. In 2012,
more than 75% of carbon monoxide (CO), and 60% of nitrogen oxides (NOx) were
emitted from on- and off-road vehicles, while mobile sources in large urban areas
accounted for as much as 90% of local CO emissions (EPA, 2011). The average
emission level of new domestic vehicles is three to ten times higher in developing
countries than that in developed countries due to lagging automotive manufactur-
ing technology, poor fuel quality, poor vehicle exhaust control, and lenient laws
controlling vehicle emissions (He et al., 2002). Apart from environmental concerns,
transport sector, which has been growing rapidly in the past decades has made ur-
1
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ban traffic jams worse and poses a large challenge to public policy making in terms
of oil security. Global vehicle ownership level has increased year on year in the last
decade and accordingly the amount of crude oil consumption by the transport sector
(IEA 20181).
The 2019 Urban Mobility Report stated that congestion wastes a massive amount
of time and fuel and creates more uncertainty for travellers and fright. In 2017, 8.8
billion hours of extra time were spent on roads and 3.3 billion gallons of fuel were
wasted. An average auto commuter spent an extra 54 hours travelling and wasted
21 gallons of fuel in 2017.
With surging vehicles on roads, many countries find themselves more dependent
on imported oil than at any time in history. Transport sector plays a more and
more important role in the energy system, oil demand and CO2 emissions. The
United States is the largest economy nowadays and emitted 17.5% of the world’s
total CO2 in 2012. USA’s transport sector consumes 27.9% of the total final en-
ergy consumption (Zhang et al., 2016). In 1993, China became a net oil-importing
country and the amount of oil imported by China in 2000 reached 70 million tons,
which took up about 30% of that year’s total oil consumption. The major reason
of this increase can be attributed to the rapid growth of the transportation sector,
particularly motor vehicles (He et al., 2005).
Both the public and governments are concerned about the perceived economic,
1 The International Energy Agency’s first Global Energy and CO2 Status Report (IEA 2018)
provides a snapshot of recent global trends and developments across fuels, renewable sources,
energy efficiency and carbon emissions from 2006 to 2017.
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environmental and security vulnerabilities arising from vehicle driving and fuel con-
sumption. Over the past decades, remarkable advances have been made to address
externalities and curb fuel consumption. Vehicles are subject to regulations con-
cerning pollution, safety and fuel economy. Among all kinds of policies that have
been implemented, taxation has been widely applied in many countries. Levying tax
on transportation fuel has been advocated to reduce pollution and conserve crude
oil. It is also expected by many government officials that by levying tax on fuel,
consumers would switch to public transport which is helpful to improve traffic situ-
ation. However, Parry et al. (2007) argues that, instead of using fuel tax, which is
a very blunt instrument for alleviating traffic congestion, the ideal strategy should
be a road-specific congestion toll. Apart from taxation, many government either
tried to offer fiscal incentives to consumers to encourage them to purchase more
fuel-efficient vehicles or to provide vehicle producers with subsidies to improve the
fuel efficiency levels of the newly produced cars.
Although fiscal policies have been widely used in transport sector to address
externalities and conserve energy, the mechanisms and interrelations behind these
policies have never been thoroughly examined. The essential purpose of this thesis
is to find out how different environmental taxes affect the economy, environment
and social welfare. We have examined the variations and distributional effects when
policy changes. We also derived the optimal environmental taxation in the presence
of other taxes.
In this chapter, we illustrate the main literature that has been discussed in
this thesis. In section 1.1, we introduce the global fuel consumption status and the
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externalities caused by vehicle driving. In section 1.2, we present how vehicle-driving
related factors are modelled in the previous literature. Finally, section 1.3 provides
the road map for this thesis.
1.1 Fuel consumption and externalities from ve-
hicle driving
Gasoline has played an important role in accelerating the world’s economy. The
consumption of gasoline is closely related to the world’s economy development status.
Figure 1.12 shows the increasing trend of global oil consumption from 19906 to 2017.
It is clear that Gas/Diesel consumption has been increasing over the past two decades
at a steady growth rate.
Figure 1.1: Oil final consumption by product, World 1996-2017
A major cause of the increase in oil consumption can be attributed to the rapid
2 Data collected from the International Energy Agency (IEA) oil information 2018.
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growth of the transportation sector. Road transportation has become increasingly
important in the urbanization process. As a result, road transportation consumes
a large amount of oil and leads to a large amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sion. It is estimated that the road transportation system accounted for 61% of oil
consumption and 70% of CO2 emissions of the whole transport sector (He et al.,
2005). Apart from carbon emissions, another significant externality caused by vehi-
cle driving is air pollution. Gasoline vehicles emit carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen
oxides (NOx), and hydrocarbons (HC). CO leads to a reduction of oxygen in the
bloodstream and causes breathing difficulty and cardiovascular effects while HC
and NOx react to sunlight to form ozone (the main component of smog) that affects
pulmonary function of children and reduces visibility. More importantly, NOx and
HC also react to form particulate matter. Fine particles (PM2.5) are small enough
to reach lung tissue and a causal relation between particulate exposure and mortal-
ity was documented by several studies3. All these effluents have posed great threat
to human health.
Another arresting externality caused by gasoline vehicles is traffic congestion.
Between 1980 and 2003, urban VMT (Vehicle Miles of Travel) in the United States
has increased by 111%, against an increase in lane-mile capacity of only 51%4.
Annual urban congestion delays increased from 16 to 47 hours per driver, while the
national cost of wasted time from congestion increased from $12.5 to $63 billion
(Lomax and Schrank, 2005).
3 See Dockery et al. (1993) and Schwartz (1994).
4 Data from U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2005.
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1.2 The economy of vehicle
This section provides reviews on how previous literature modelled vehicle driving
service and vehicle attributes.
1.2.1 Driving service
Vehicle driving contributes to many externalities and lots of the externality-related
problems are solved through individual choice problems in economic literature. The
standard procedure is to put vehicle-related factors into economic agent’s utility
function separately from consumption and leisure. To produce vehicle miles of travel,
both vehicle and gasoline are needed.
Vehicle, as a type of capital, and gasoline could enter the household’s utility
function separately. Bento et al. (2009) assume households obtain utility from car
ownership and utility depends on characteristics of the automobile as well as vehicle
miles of travel. In their model, if the households have car endowment, they need to
choose whether to hold the car or to scrape it; if the households relinquish the car,
they also need to decide whether to purchase a new one or not. The representative
household’s utility is expressed by:
Uij = Uij(zj,Mi, xi), (1.2.1)
where zj is a vector of qualities of car j. Mi and xi, respectively, refer to household
i’s vehicle miles of travel and its consumption of normal good.
Putting vehicle characters and vehicle miles of travel separately in the utility
function, the qualities of vehicles are depicted more delicately. However, vehicle
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miles of travel is closely related to both the vehicle type and the amount of gaso-
line consumed. Thus, modelling vehicle driving in this way fails at capturing that
interrelation.
Parry and Small (2005) consider a static model in a closed economy to derive
optimal fuel tax formula, taking vehicle-related externalities into consideration. In
their model, vehicle type and gasoline consumption together determine vehicle miles
of travel. The representative household’s utility function takes the following form:
U = U(Ψ(C,M, T,G), N)− φ(P )− δ(A), (1.2.2)
where C denotes the quantity of a numeraire consumption good, M vehicle miles
of travel, T the time spent on driving, G government spending, N leisure, P the
quantity of pollution and A the severity-adjusted traffic accidents.
It is clear that the utility function has been refined to better present vehicle-
related factors. Especially, they define vehicle miles of travel M as:
M = M(F,H), (1.2.3)
where F denotes gasoline consumption and H represents a monetary measure of
other driving costs which depends on vehicle prices and attributes.
This function embeds the inner substitution effect between gasoline consumption
and vehicle attributes. When the price of gasoline increases, drivers either drive less
(lower H) or switch to more fuel-efficient ones which increase H. In this way, the
interrelation between gasoline consumption and vehicle attributes is successfully
captured. However, they do not specify an exact function form to illustrate this
relationship.
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1.2.2 Fuel efficiency and vintage
Given the fact that both vehicle and gasoline are needed in order to produce mileage
of travel, it is inevitable to model car attributes. Among all the attributes, fuel
efficiency is the main cause for different vehicle mileage of travel given the same
amount of gasoline. Therefore, how to model fuel efficiency is rudimentary for the
model setting. Previous research have tried different ways to model fuel efficiency.
In the foregoing discussion, Parry and Small (2005) put car attributes and gaso-
line consumption together to produce vehicle miles of travel (Eq. 1.2.3). Although
the interaction between F and H is not stated explicitly, this function allows for a
non-proportional relation between gasoline consumption and vehicle miles of travel.
However, what the exact relation is calls for further assumption and explanations.
Fuel efficiency standards have been applied worldwide as a regulatory mechanism
to address externalities and preserve oil. In the wake of 1973 oil crisis, the corporate
average fuel economy (CAFE) was put into practice in the United States. These
standards impose a limit on the average fuel economy of the vehicles sold by a
particular company each year, with separate limits for passenger cars and light duty
trucks (Jacobsen, 2013). Given that the CAFE standards state the fuel economy in
terms of miles-per-gallon, lots of research use miles-per-gallon to proxy fuel efficiency
when evaluating the policy empirically. However, this method has disadvantage in
analytical study: it ignores the interrelation between fuel efficiency and gasoline
consumption.
Wei (2013) comes up with a model where she uses production function to model
the relation between fuel efficiency, gasoline consumption and vehicle miles of travel.
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At time t− j, the representative household chooses fuel efficiency by choosing kt−j
which represents both the transportation capital configured in the vehicle and the
capital-gasoline ratio at full capacity. Once household made the decision, an id-
iosyncratic productivity term, ζi , is revealed for each vehicle i. Once settled, ζi and
kt−j will not change during the life span of the vehicle. Denoting the gasoline use
by Oi,t,j, vehicles miles of travel in period t by vehicle i produced at t− j is:
Mi,t,j = ζik
α
t−jOi,t,j. (1.2.4)
Wei (2013) uses putty-clay production technology to differentiate vehicles em-
bedding different fuel efficiency levels and that is vehicles with different vintages.
Putty-clay technology, originally introduced by Johansen (1959), provides an al-
ternative description of production and capital accumulation that breaks the tight
restrictions on short-run production possibilities imposed by Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy. He builds up a natural framework for examining issues related to irreversible
investment. With putty-clay capital, the ex-ante production technology allows for
substitution between capital and labour, but once the capital good is installed, the
technology is Leontief with productivity determined by the embodied level of vintage
technology and the ex-post fixed choice of capital intensity (Gilchrist and Williams,
2000). In producing vehicle miles of travel, the producing inputs are transporta-
tion capital and gasoline. Before investing in transportation capital, the production
technology is considered to be in Cobb-Douglas form with constant return to scale.
However, once the configuration is set, transportation capital and gasoline could not
substitute each other as in the normal Cobb-Douglas production function. The only
production input is the transportation capital-gasoline ratio.
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Solow et al. (1960a), Cooley et al. (1997) and Jovanovic (1998) look into other
ways to interpret vintage capital. They argue that the latest technology is only
incorporated in the latest capital, while old capital still uses the technology from
the time it was produced. Therefore, an economy where old capital embedded with
old technology while new capital with latest technology is more realistic. In Solow
(1962), capital has a fixed lifetime and the amount of labour allocated to given unit
of capital is fixed at the time it is introduced.
Consider a representative plant owning capital of vintage i. This plant can
choose to produce either consumption goods or capital goods. Consumption goods
production function is:
ci = k
α
i l
β
i , (1.2.5)
where 0 ≤ α, β, α + β ≤ 1.
ci is the consumption goods output, and ki, li denote capital of vintage i and
unskilled labour. Instead of fixing production input ratio, they use capital hetero-
geneity to model capitals embedding different technologies. Putty clay is of great
value in modelling the relationship of vehicle miles of travel.
1.3 A road map for this thesis
In this thesis, we aim to explore the relationship between vehicle driving and pub-
lic policies from three different angles: how different policies affect vehicle driving
decision making, the optimal environmental tax structure in the first best, and the
optimal environmental taxes in the presence of other distortionary taxes.
In Chapter 2, we examined the impact of two policy options on vehicle driving,
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environmental quality, the economy and social welfare: 1) fuel tax, and 2) clean
vehicle subsidies. This model is characterised by two production sectors, namely, the
general production sector producing consumption goods and the vehicle production
sector producing vehicles of different vintages (new and old). In line with empirical
findings, our analytical results illustrate that households prefer new cars rather than
old ones so that more gasoline is consumed by new cars. Our simulation on the
U.S. economy shows that all three policy options are efficient in reducing pollution.
However, they have distinctly different distributional effects on the economy and
social welfare.
In Chapter 3, we explored the structure of optimal environmental taxes in the
presence of driving externalities (pollution and congestion) by extending the model
developed in Chapter 2. We find that the optimal gasoline taxes are determined
by two opposing forces caused by gasoline consumption: marginal cost of pollution
and marginal cost of congestion. Optimal road taxes formulas show that the tax
rates in the long run depend on the gasoline consumption ratio between the new
cars and the old cars. Our calibration on the U.S. economy shows that the optimal
levels of environmental taxes are affected by the households’ preferences on the
environmental factors. Moreover, to match with real life scenario, we derived the
optimal uniform gasoline tax and examine the impact on the optimal road taxes. We
find that the cost of long-run social welfare increases slightly when uniform gasoline
tax is charged. However, the difference is not substantial.
In Chapter 4, we examined the optimal environmental tax structure when other
distortionary taxes are considered. We find that the additive property between the
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Pigovian element and the efficiency element proposed by Sandmo (1975) is retained
in our model. And the optimal tax formulations are determined by the degree of
complementarity with normal consumption goods.
Finally, Chapter 5 provides summaries of each chapters and future work plans.
Chapter 2
Fuel Tax, Clean Vehicle Subsidies
and Earmarking Policy: A
General Equilibrium Analysis in a
Dynamic Two-Period Vintage
Model
In this chapter, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium infinite-horizon model
with physical capital and vehicles, where vehicles are of two vintages (new and
old), and investigate the impact of fuel taxes and clean technology subsidies to fuel
efficiency production on driving behaviour, vehicle production, fuel consumption,
environmental quality and welfare. We first show that, because of new cars are
embedded with higher fuel efficiency, households proportionally drive new cars for
13
2.1. Introduction 14
longer distances (or more often) than old cars. This leads to new cars consuming
more fuel in equilibrium. Subsequently we explore the effects of the policy options
numerically. Computation results of the steady states show that all policies reduce
overall fuel consumption which leads to a lower level of pollution and thus enhance
environmental quality. However, clean technology subsidies distort resource allo-
cation in the vehicle production sector (causing production inefficiency) which in
turn leads to a decrease in the general consumption, fuel consumption (through a
decrease in fuel import) and leisure (through the income effect). Social welfare de-
pends on the subsidy level. Low subsidies increase welfare very rapidly while higher
levels decrease it. Because of the overall increase in consumption and environmental
quality, social welfare improves.
2.1 Introduction
Vehicles are the main culprit of urban air pollution, especially in developing countries
(Small and Kazimi, 1995). Global vehicle ownership levels has increased year on
year in the last decade and accordingly the amount of crude oil consumption by the
transport sector (IEA 2018 1). In addition to increased oil consumption, emissions
from transport sector can be attributed to missed opportunities for improving energy
efficiency and lenient pollution regulations, especially in developing countries. The
average emission levels of new domestic vehicles are 3-10 times higher in developing
1The International Energy Agency’s first Global Energy and CO2 Status Report (IEA 2018)
provides a snapshot of recent global trends and developments across fuels, renewable sources,
energy efficiency and carbon emissions from 2006 to 2017.
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countries than that in developed countries (He et al., 2002).
There has been heated discussions in policy circles on reducing fuel consumption,
improving fuel efficiency, providing incentives for clean technology and therefore ad-
dressing the pollution externality caused by vehicle driving. Many countries have
attempted to address these problems by implementing fuel efficiency standards2,
and market-based mechanisms of pollution controls such as fuel taxes and subsidies
(towards both consumers and manufacturers). Fuel taxes made its first appearance
in early 1900s as a way to raise government revenue and are widely used by many
countries nowadays (See OECD (2018)). Energy efficiency subsidies are a more re-
cent government policy having appeared in the early 2000s. For example, in the US,
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided for a maximum of $3400 tax credit towards
hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) purchase between 2006 and 2010 (Hao et al., 2014).
Firms were also given incentives to produce clean vehicle. The Partnership for a
New Generation of Vehicles, formed in 1993, was a project conducted between the
U.S. government and the three major domestic auto corporations, aimed at bringing
fuel-efficient vehicles to the market (McCosh, 1994). During Obama administration,
the U.S. government pledged $2.4 billion in federal grants to support the develop-
ment of next generation electric vehicles and batteries. The funds were allocated
to manufacturers towards three main streams: 1) the production of highly efficient
batteries and their components; 2) the production of other components needed for
2For example, Corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards are enacted by the United
States in 1975. European Union has entered into a series of voluntary agreements called the
European Union Automotive Fuel Economy Policy.
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electric vehicles; 3) the demonstration and evaluation of plug-in hybrids and other
electric infrastructure concepts3.Recently the attention has shifted from looking at
those instruments in isolation towards policies that combine them (Tanishita et al.,
2003). Earmarking the revenues from the gasoline taxes towards subsidies for im-
proving fuel efficiency is also gaining support in political circles.
This paper aims at providing a detailed theoretical framework to assess the im-
pact on fuel consumption, fuel efficiency, pollution, environmental quality and wel-
fare under two different policy options: 1) fuel tax on households’ fuel consumption
and 2) subsidy towards clean technology, which targets specifically at the engine of
the vehicles, in vehicle production sector.
While the empirical literature on estimating the economic and environmental
impact of policies is vast4, the theoretical literature analyzing fuel policies is quite
limited.
Parry and Small (2005) sets up a structural static model to determine the optimal
fuel tax in the presence of externalities caused by driving where revenue from fuel
tax is used towards reducing the households labour income tax. They show that
the current fuel tax rate is too low in the United States and too high in the United
Kingdom.
Wei (2013) constructs a dynamic vintage model to assess the economic and en-
vironmental impact of increasing fuel taxes (with revenues being recycled through
3 Like truck stop charging station, electric rail, and training for technicians to build and repair
electric vehicles (green jobs).
4 Parry et al. (2007) reviews the empirical literature on automobiles externalities and policies
to address them.
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lump-sum transfers) and tightening fuel efficiency standards. She shows that both
policy instruments are successful in the long run in reducing fuel consumption, but
they are different in their transmission channels and may have different economic
and environmental impact.
Our model is novel in several aspects. First, differently from Parry and Small
(2005), we develop a framework where dynamic relationships are present to capture
the long-run nature of pollution and capital accumulation. A dynamic model is
useful to interpret pollution issues as those generally accumulate over time and also
affect environmental quality over time. Any policies addressing pollution issues will
also have long-run effects both on the environment and social welfare. Furthermore,
we do not analyse optimal policies but focus on fuel policy reforms.
Differently from Wei (2013) who adopts a vintage model with putty-clay tech-
nology to model households’ driving decisions, we introduce vintage vehicles using
capital heterogeneity. Solow et al. (1960a) and Cooley et al. (1997) point out that
the latest technology is only incorporated into the latest capital, while old capital
still uses the technology from the time it was produced. Wei (2013) uses putty-clay
technology with Leontief production possibilities to model vehicle mileage of travel
where the ratio of vehicle capital to energy consumption is fixed ex post production.
Vehicle capital, however, is special in that it could generate mileage of travel given
any amount of fuel pumped in. Leontief possibilities thus do not match with vehicle
features. We therefore adopt capital heterogeneity to model mileage of travel.
Furthermore we offer a novel way of modelling vehicle capital and fuel efficiency.
Previous theoretical literature (e.g.Wei (2013) and Parry and Small (2005)) has
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assumed that all components of vehicle capital are indistinguishably linked to fuel
efficiency. We expand this framework to model two distinct attributes of vehicle
capital, one being the size of the vehicle and the other embedding fuel efficiency and
clean technology. An example of an attribute reflecting the latter dimension is a more
fuel-efficient engine which not only results in more miles per gallon (mpg) but also
mitigate the polluting emissions (e.g. a hybrid electric motor). This specification
allows us to capture the firm’s choice in the quality-quantity dimension (whether to
produce bigger-sized cars or more fuel-efficient and cleaner engines) and ultimately
the resulting overall fuel efficiency of the vehicle (the end product). In addition, it
enables us to investigate the role of government subsidies in influencing production
of more fuel-efficient and cleaner engines.
We summarize the results as follows. First, in terms of driving choices, house-
holds purchase more fuel for new cars than old cars. Households also prefer to
use new cars more often than old cars. Second, simulation results show that fuel
consumption and pollution levels decrease under all policies.
Levying fuel tax does not improve the overall fuel efficiency (mpg) of the vehicles
and also barely changes output. It alleviates pollution which in turns enhances
environmental quality and eventually improves social welfare.
Providing subsidies, instead, leads to more resources allocated to the production
of more fuel-efficient and cleaner engines, which results in higher capital accumula-
tion and labour supply in the production sector. The overall fuel efficiency does not
change significantly as producers substitute away from the size attribute towards
the fuel-efficient attribute. As subsidy rate increases, social welfare first improves
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and then plunges when production inefficiencies kick in.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model and
its dynamics. Section 2.3 presents the steady-state analytical results. Section 3.2
presents the benchmark calibration. Section 2.5 examines the economic impact of
the three policies. Section 4.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
This section describes a decentralized economy including firms, households and
the government. Section 2.2.1 presents the production technology and the profit-
maximizing problems for the firms. Households’ problem modelling consumption,
driving and other services is discussed in section 2.2.2 where we also explain how cap-
ital heterogeneity is applied to model driving services. Government’s policy options
are discussed in section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Firms
There are two production sectors in the economy: the general production sector G
and the vehicle production sector F .
General production sector
At each period t, firms hire labour lgt and capital k
g
t at the rate of w
g
t and r
g
t from
the households to produce final output which can be used for consumption, capital
accumulation and fuel import. The generated profits pigt goes to the households.
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The final good, G, is produced with constant-return-to-scale technology:
G(kgt , l
g
t ) = A1(k
g
t )
α1(lgt )
1−α1 , (2.2.1)
with resource constraint:
G(kgt , l
g
t ) = ct + kt+1 − (1− k)kt + pt(gt,1 + gt,2), (2.2.2)
where ct denotes consumption, k measures capital depreciation and pt is fuel price
assumed to be fixed in the world market5. gt,1 represents fuel consumed by new cars
and gt,2 old cars. kt denotes the total capital at time t.
Firms maximize profits pigt at each time period with respect to the amount of
capital kgt and labour l
g
t they hire
6.
max
kgt ,l
g
t
pigt = G(k
g
t , l
g
t )− wgt lgt − rgt kgt . (2.2.3)
The corresponding first order conditions are:
rgt = Gkgt , (2.2.4)
wgt = Glgt . (2.2.5)
Vehicle production sector
Vehicle, as a type of capital good, is made up of two attributes, the chassis of
the car a and the fuel efficiency component δ (the car engine power). Those two
5We assume that the gasoline consumption in this open economy depends on import and the
demand will not affect the world oil price.
6We model the decentralised economy as the households bear the depreciation costs. Another
equivalent way would be firms bear the depreciation which would change the factor price in the
equilibrium accordingly.
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components are produced separately but must be sold as a combined product. Fuel
efficiency, embedding clean technology, is the crucial part in mitigating air pollution
(see Eq.2.2.21).
Firms in the vehicle production sector hire labour lat and capital k
a
t at the rate of
wat and r
a
t to produce vehicle capital at and fuel efficiency δt
7. Firms sell the final
vehicle product atδt to households at the price q
a
t . The resource constraint reads:
F (kat , l
a
t ) = at + µδt
8, (2.2.6)
where µ is the marginal rate of transformation between a and δ and µ > 0.
The problem facing the firms in this sector is:
max
kat ,l
a
t ,δt
piat = q
a
t (atδt)− rat kat − wat lat + (stδt), (2.2.7)
where stδt appears when government adopts the policy of providing subsidy towards
clean technology (higher δ) and st denotes the subsidy rate.
We assume Cobb-Douglas technology in labour and capital:
F (kat , l
a
t ) = A2(k
a
t )
α2(lat )
1
2
−α2 . (2.2.8)
Notice that vehicle production, aδ, is constant-return-to-scale in capital kat and
lat (i.e. doubling k
a
t and l
a
t , will double aδ)
9.
7 Differently from Wei (2013), we have disentangled the vehicle into the vehicle capital and
engine fuel efficiency so that we could model specifically the effect of subsidies.
8 The resource available in vehicle production sector (Eq.2.2.8) can be allocated to either pro-
duce more vehicle capital (a) or more fuel efficiency (δ). It shows the trade-off between quality and
quantity. If firms decide to put more resource to produce vehicle capital a, then the fuel efficiency
δ embedded in the vehicle will be lower which means that vehicles are less efficient in producing
mileage of travel.
9 We specifically assume that the power adds up to 12 . If there is no externalities in the economy,
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The first-order conditions for the vehicle producer are:
rat = q
a
t δtFkat , (2.2.9)
wat = q
a
t δtFlat , (2.2.10)
qat [F (k
a
t , l
a
t )− µδt]− µqat δt + (st) = 0. (2.2.11)
Equilibrium conditions in production
Market clearing implies:
kat + k
g
t = kt, (2.2.12)
lgt + l
a
t = lt, (2.2.13)
where kt denotes the total capital and lt the total labour at time period t and
wat = w
g
t = wt, (2.2.14)
rat = r
g
t = rt. (2.2.15)
2.2.2 Households
Preference
Many identical infinitely-lived households face log preferences for consumption ct,
driving service Mt, leisure 1− lt and environmental quality Nt.
U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt) = φ1 log ct + φ2 logMt + (1− φ1 − φ2) log (1− lt) + φ3 logNt.
(2.2.16)
Equation 2.2.11 become qat (F − µδt − µδt). In order for the final production to be constant return
to scale, we will have
qat
µ (
F
2 )
2 − rat kat − wat lat = 0. Thus,to make (F2 )2 constant return to scale, F
has to be diminishing return to scale and the power has to sum up to 12 .
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Production of driving services
There are two types of vehicles in the market: new cars and old cars. We follow
Solow et al. (1960b) and Cooley et al. (1997) to model vintage capital with ”putty-
clay” technology. After production, the technology embedded in the vehicle will not
change, which implies that the mileage of travel over one unit of fuel consumed is
fixed for different vehicle vintages. Vehicles need one period of configuration and
will be used by households for two periods before getting scraped. New cars are
produced at time period t − 1. Old cars are produced at time period t − 2 and
are also subject to depreciation 1 − ρ from already being used for a time period.
Following Wei (2013), mileage of travel produced by new cars mt,1 and old cars mt,2
are:
mt,1 = (at−1δt−1)γgt,1, (2.2.17)
mt,2 = (ρat−2δt−2)γgt,2, (2.2.18)
where 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1. γ measures the production technology embedded in
the vehicle. If γ becomes higher, given the same amount of gasoline, more mileage
of travel will be produced.
The representative household owns both new cars and old cars. Driving service
Mt at each time period is composed of mileage of travel produced by new cars mt,1
and old cars mt,2:
Mt = (m
σ
t,1 +m
σ
t,2)
1
σ , (2.2.19)
where 0 < σ < 1 and it measures the price elasticity of demand.
We set the preference for Mt following Grossman and Helpman (1991) to guar-
antee that household exhibits preference for variety over quantity, which means that
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household always prefers to use both types of cars instead of just using new cars.
Environmental quality
Environmental quality is modelled as a type of renewable resource. The quality
of the environment, N , represents the stock of natural capital and accumulates
based on the regenerating ability of nature while depreciates due to pollution P .
N evolves over time according to the following function based on Bovenberg and
Smulders (1995):
Nt+1 −Nt = E(Nt)− Pt, (2.2.20)
where E(Nt) represents the nature’s assimilating ability or ecological services pro-
duced by nature, that is the amount of pollution that can be assimilated without
a change in the environmental quality. We could also interpret Eq.2.2.20 as that
changes to the environmental quality and pollution are two rival users of ecological
services. Nature’s assimilating ability E(Nt) takes the function form:
E(Nt) = φ− Nt,
where φ denotes the original state and  represents the nature’s rate of assimilating
pollutants (0 <  < 1).
Pollution
Our specification of pollution is based on Selden and Song (1995): pollution Pt is
caused by the consumption of fuel (gt,1, gt,2) but mitigated by vehicles’ fuel-efficiency
conditions (δt−1, δt−2), with ∂P/∂g > 0, ∂P/∂δ < 0, ∂2P/∂g2 = 0 and ∂2P/∂δ2 > 0.
Pt =
gt,1
δµ1t−1
+
gt,2
δµ2t−2
, (2.2.21)
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where parameters µ1 and µ2 measure the ability of mitigating pollution by different
vintages of cars and µ1 > µ2.
Household’s problem
Each period, the representative household supplies labour lt and capital kt to firms
and receives the profits generated in both sectors (pigt and pi
a
t ). Household purchases
consumption goods, fuel, new vehicles and invest.
Household maximizes its life-long utility:
max
ct,gt,1,gt,2,atδt,lt
∞∑
s=0
βt+sU(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt), (2.2.22)
subject to the restriction:
piat +pi
g
t +wtlt+rtkt+Tt = (pt+τt)(gt,1+gt,2)+kt+1−(1−k)kt+ct+qat (atδt). (2.2.23)
The household takes the environmental quality Nt as given. τt is the unit tax
levied by the government on the consumption of fuel if government were to adopt
fuel tax policy. Tt represents the lump-sum tax (negative) if government were to
implement production subsides towards clean technology . It becomes lump-sum
transfer (positive) if government were to levy tax on fuel consumption. Notice that
vehicle price qat clears the market for household and vehicle production sector.
The optimality conditions are derived in Appendix 2.7.1.
2.2.3 Government
Government has two policy options: 1) Levy tax τt on household’s purchase of fuel,
2) Subsidize firms’ production of more fuel efficient engines (st) and 3) earmarking
the revenues from the gasoline taxes towards subsidies for improving fuel efficiency.
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The first two policy options will always hold through lump-sum transfer by gov-
ernment. Under the earmarking policy, the government constraint reads:
stδt = τt(gt,1 + gt,2). (2.2.24)
2.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the steady-state solutions of the model and derive
long-run fuel consumption and households’ driving decisions10. A competitive equi-
librium needs to be defined first.Take all the prices as given, 1) households maximise
Eq.2.2.22 subject to Eq.2.2.23; 2)representative goods producer maximises profits
according to Eq.2.2.3; 3) representative vehicle producer maximises profits according
to Eq.2.2.7 and 4) markets clear according to Eq.2.2.2 and Eq.2.2.23.
Proposition 1. The long-run ratio of fuel consumption between the new cars and
the old cars is given by:
g1,ss
g2,ss
= ρ
γσ
σ−1 . (2.3.25)
Here the subscript ss represents the steady state.
Proposition 1 characterizes the fuel consumption ratio between new cars and old
cars. The steady-state fuel consumption ratio does not depend on the policy. It only
depends on the depreciation rate of vehicle 1− ρ, mileage production technology γ
and driving service preference σ. In the long run, new cars in total will consume
10Given the gasoline consumption ratio and miles-of-travel ratio, we can also conclude that there
is no rebound effect in this model.
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more fuel compared to old cars despite being more fuel-efficient11.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.2
Proposition 2. Using the previous result, we can also obtain the mileage-of-travel
ratio between the new cars and the old cars:
m1,ss
m2,ss
= ρ
γ
σ−1 . (2.3.26)
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.3
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium solution to the mileage ratio among
two types of vehicles. Overall, households prefer to use new cars more often than
old cars given that new cars are more efficient in providing driving services.
In the next two sections, we calibrate the model and use the analytical closed-
form solutions to characterize the paths of the key endogenous variables responding
to different policy options.
2.4 Calibration
This section describes the benchmark calibration of the parameters. The values of
parameter (shown in Table 2.1) are based on the comprehensive reviews of relevant
literature, like Wei (2013), Parry and Small (2005) and Chen et al. (2006). There
are four categories of parameters: the first relates to driving service and fuel usage.
111 − ρ measures the depreciation of vehicle having been used for a period (0 < ρ < 1). γ
measures the production level of fuel efficiency (0 < γ < 1) and σ measures the price elasticity of
demand in driving service (0 < σ < 1).
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The second is about production technology and the third specifies the preferences of
the household. The forth category is about the environmental quality and pollution.
The details of calibration can be found in Appendix 2.7.4.
Category Parameters Description Notation Value
Driving Service Vehicle leftover rate ρ 0.9
Vehicle preference σ 0.5
Mileage production technology γ 0.42
Production Technology Capital depreciation rate k 0.1
Capital share in production α1,α2 0.33/0.42
Productivity level A1, A2 1
Marginal transformation rate µ 1
Fuel price pt 1.0872
Household Preference Subjective discount rate β 0.97
Weight on consumption φ1 0.34
Weight on driving φ2 0.05
Weight on environmental quality φ3 1
Environmental Factor The capacity of fuel efficiency µ1,µ2 1
Original state of environment φ 0.25
Natural purifying capacity  0.1
Table 2.1: Benchmark Calibration
2.5 Comparative statics of policies
In this section, we use the calibrated model to examine the efficacy of the three
policy options in addressing pollution and curbing fuel consumption: 1) fuel taxes on
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households’ fuel consumption (τt); 2) subsidies towards clean technology (st) and 3)
earmarking gasoline taxes revenue to subsidize the production of more fuel-efficient
vehicles. We first examine the long-run paths of endogenous variables responding
to increasing tax rates and subsidy rate. We then assess their long-run impact on
environmental quality. Finally we examine whether the policies make the society
better off or not.
2.5.1 The impact of policies on economy
In this section, we plot the equilibrium paths of key endogenous variables responding
to increasing fuel prices and increasing subsidies.
Figure 2.1 shows the impact of increasing fuel tax on the economy. In the long
run, capital accumulation, labour supply decreases slightly. Fuel efficiency and ve-
hicle price rarely change. The direct impact of fuel tax is on fuel consumption.
Increasing tax rate makes it more expensive to purchase fuel and households thus
reduce their demand for fuel. Eq.2.3.25 characterizes the constant fuel consumption
ratio between new cars and old cars. This is also observed in Fig.2.1 where fuel
consumed by both new cars and old cars keep decreasing but the ratio stays un-
changed. Moreover, households switch their demand from driving towards general
consumption facing increasing fuel price. Pollution gets alleviated only due to the
decreasing fuel consumption.
Figure 2.2 depicts the economy under subsidy policy option. As illustrated in our
model, vehicles are produced by capital ka and labour la. Increasing clean technol-
ogy subsidies provides incentive for firms to allocate more resources to produce more
2.5. Comparative statics of policies 30
Figure 2.1: Comparative-static effects of implementing fuel tax τ alone.
fuel-efficient and cleaner engines (δ). Thus proportionally, δ takes heavier weight in
the vehicle production sector. That explains the increment of δ and contraction of
a. Overall, miles per gallon of a vehicle, measured by (aδ)γ does not change signifi-
cantly. Households, at the beginning, benefit from driving more as mpg of vehicles
improve. After certain point, however, the product gap between a and δ is so big
that the production inefficiency starts to kick in, which leads to households decrease
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Figure 2.2: Comparative-static effects of implementing subsidy s alone.
their demand for driving. Production inefficiency also results in consumption and
leisure monotonically decreasing in level of subsidy. Pollution level keeps dropping
due to both the improvement of fuel efficiency (δ) and the decreasing consumption
of fuel.
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2.5.2 The impact of policies on the environment and welfare
The major goals of levying tax and subsidizing the environmentally-friendly engine
production are to curb fuel consumption and to address the pollution issues caused
by vehicle driving so as to improve social welfare. In this section, we use the cal-
ibrated model to examine the impact of policies on the environmental quality and
welfare and also check the robustness of our model by conducting sensitivity analysis
with different parameter values.
Environment
We investigate the long-run effect of the policies on the environmental quality. En-
vironmental quality N is a stock value and its change depends on two opposing
factors: nature’s assimilating capacity and the pollution.
We measure different levels of long-run environmental quality when the envi-
ronment assimilating ability differs (). Fig.2.3 depicts the effects of policies on
the environmental quality under two policy options in turn: 1) fuel tax only and
2) subsidy towards clean technology. Environmental quality improves due to the
decreasing pollution under all policies. A lower level of pollution (higher nature’s
assimilating capacity) means that fewer ecological services are needed to compensate
for the adverse effect pollution has had on the environmental quality. Lower pollu-
tion in turn results in a higher level of environmental quality. When environment has
a higher assimilating ability ( is higher), the corresponding long-run environmental
quality is higher as well. The concavity also reveals that the environmental quality
will not explode as the ecological services provided in nature is limited (Smulders,
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Figure 2.3: The effects of different policies on the environmental quality
2000).
Welfare
Household obtains utility from driving but also suffers from the pollution caused
by vehicle driving. How much households value the environmental quality depends
on several factors. We investigate whether the policies improve social welfare given
different willingness to pay for the environmental quality. According to Jackson
(1983), place of residence affects household’s preference for the environmental qual-
ity: centre city has the benchmark preference value 1, suburb suffers more from
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pollution thus household living there puts more weight on the environmental qual-
ity, φ3 = 1.4. Rural areas have the least willingness to pay for better environmental
quality, with φ3 = 0.56.
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Figure 2.4: The effects of different policies on social welfare
Fig.2.4 shows the effects of fuel tax and subsidy rate on welfare. Three cases
where people have different preferences for the environmental quality are measured in
the figure. Overall, under fuel tax only policy and earmarking policy, the decreasing
pollution level improves the environmental quality. Although higher fuel price makes
consumers drive less, they switch their demand towards normal consumption good.
Therefore, we observe the improvement of social welfare in the long run.
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Long-run social welfare is more complex under the subsidy policy. Subsidies to
fuel efficiency, on the one hand makes vehicles consume less fuel and consequently
improves environmental quality, thereby mitigating the externality. On the other
hand, subsidies cause a miss-allocation of resources on the production side (produc-
tion inefficiency), which has a negative income effect (the economy produces inside
its production possibilities frontier). In terms of welfare, the subsidies will improve
welfare if the externality-mitigating effect dominates the production-inefficiency ef-
fect. Our numerical analysis suggests that for low levels of the subsidy the exter-
nality effect dominates, while for high levels of the subsidy production inefficiency
becomes dominant. Consequently welfare is increasing in the subsidy for low levels
and declining for high levels (inverted U shape).
2.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a new dynamic general equilibrium infinite-horizon model with
vehicles which are of two vintages. Our aim is to analyse the endogenous determina-
tion of fuel consumption, fuel efficiency, households driving choices, environmental
quality and social welfare under two policy options: 1) government levies tax on
fuel and 2) government provides subsidy to firms to produce more fuel-efficient and
cleaner engines. Our analyses demonstrate that at the steady state, households
prefer to use new cars more often than old cars and fuel consumed by new cars is
proportionally higher than fuel consumed by old cars.
Our numerical analysis show that providing subsidies to firms leads to more
resources being allocated to the production of more fuel-efficient engines and less
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towards households’ consumption and leisure which eventually decreases social wel-
fare.
Instead, levying tax on fuel would not distort the production side of the economy.
By increasing fuel tax rate, government can be assured to achieve fuel consumption
reduction and pollution control. Environmental quality and social welfare in the
long run improve.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Optimality conditions derivation for household’s prob-
lem
Household maximizes its discounted life time utility, as shown in Eq.2.2.22 subject
to its budget constraint Eq.2.2.23.
Thus, the Lagrangian reads:
L =
∞∑
s=0
βt+s[U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt) + λt+s(piat + pigt + wtlt + rtkt − (pt + τt)(gt,1 + gt,2)
−kt+1 + (1− k)kt − ct − qat (atδt))].
(2.A.1)
We then obtain the first-order conditions:
Uct
Uct+1
= β(1− k + rt+1), (2.A.2)
∂Ut
∂Mt
∂Mt
∂mt,i
∂mt,i
∂gt,i
= Uct(pt + τt), i = 1, 2 (2.A.3)
β
(
∂Ut+1
∂Mt+1
∂Mt+1
∂mt+1,1
∂mt+1,1
∂atδt
)
+ β2
(
∂Ut+2
∂Mt+2
∂Mt+2
∂mt+2,2
∂mt+2,2
∂atδt
)
= qatUct , (2.A.4)
U1−lt = wtUct . (2.A.5)
2.7.2 Proof for proposition 1
In the steady state, Eq.2.A.3 becomes:
∂U
∂M
M1−σss
mσ2,ss
g2,ss
=
∂U
∂M
M1−σss
mσ1,ss
g1,ss
. (2.7.6)
Eq.2.7.6 states that in the steady state, the marginal utility of fuel consumption for
both types of vehicles are the same. Simplify Eq. 2.7.6 we can obtain Eq.2.3.25.
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2.7.3 Proof for proposition 2
In the steady state, Eq.2.2.17 and 2.2.18 become:
m1,ss = (assδss)
γg1,ss, (2.7.7)
m2,ss = (ρassδss)
γg2,ss. (2.7.8)
Thus, using Eq.2.3.25 we could get the mileage ratio between two types of vehicles
in the equilibrium.
2.7.4 Calibration
Parameters related to driving service
The driving service is provided by two types of cars: old cars and new cars. ρ
measures vehicle wear-out status which affects the fuel efficiency condition in the
next period. We set ρ to be 0.9. σ measures the preferences over different types of
cars and we set it to 0.5. According to Chen et al. (2006), consumption output ratio
is around 0.65 and Ferdous et al. (2010) states that personal cars spending over
household expenditure ratio is 6%. According to the steady state equilibrium of
the economy, Eq.2.3.25 states the fuel consumption ratio between new cars and old
cars. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010) data, the newly
produced light-duty vehicles fuel consumption is 921 gallon per vehicle in 2010 and
882 gallon per vehicle in 2009. Thus, we use the ratio of two years to proxy the fuel
consumption ratio between two different types of cars. Using the ratio, we get:
ρ
γσ
σ−1 = 1.0452.
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In the steady state, Eq.2.A.4 becomes:
φ1(1 + ρ
γσ
σ−1 )aδqa = βφ2γ(ρ
γσ
σ−1 + β)g2c.
Using the consumption output ratio (0.65), personal cars spending over expendi-
ture ratio (0.06) and substituting ρ
γσ
σ−1 = 1.0452 in, we obtain the value of γ = 0.42.
Parameters related to production technology
The second category of parameters relates to production sector. Parameter εk de-
notes the depreciation rate of physical capital and we set it to be 0.1. The mean value
of the annual real fuel price pt is 1.0872 dollar. The aggregate productivity level of
both sector, A1 and A2 are normalized to 1. The parameter α is considered as the
share of total income paid to owners of capital and we set α1 and α2 to 0.33 and 0.42
based on the calibration results from Wei (2013). µ is the marginal transformation
of vehicle capital and fuel efficiency and we set that to 1 for simplicity.
Parameters related to the preference of households
The third category of parameter describes the preferences of household. The subjec-
tive discount rate β is 0.97. In the model, we assume log-preference for consumption,
driving service, leisure and environmental quality shown in Eq.2.2.16, which implies
that consumption and driving service are not perfect substitutes. We calibrate the
parameters φ1 and φ2 to 0.34 and 0.05 respectively to match the fact that households
allocate two thirds of their time in leisure.
Based on Ghez et al. (1975), households normally spend one third of their time
to market activities(time not spent on sleeping or personal maintenance). The fuel
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consumption output ratio (Eq.2.A.3) in steady state becomes:
φ2c = φ1(pt + τt)(g1 + g2).
Dividing each side by output and using the consumption output ratio and fuel
expenditure over income ratio, we calibrate the parameter φ1 and φ2 to 0.34 and
0.05.
Households benefit from good environmental quality. Jackson (1983) shows that
although the household’s willingness to pay for better environmental quality is sen-
sitive to the model specification and other assumptions, the income elasticity is in
the vicinity of 1. We thus set the benchmark value for φ3 to 1.
Parameters related to environmental quality and pollution
The concept of environmental quality is depicted in Eq.2.2.20. Environmental qual-
ity is a stock which is improved every period by natural purification capacity and
damaged by the pollution.  measures nature’s purifying capacity and we set it to
0.1. Pollution, as expressed in Eq.2.2.21, is positively related to fuel consumption
but mitigated by the fuel efficiency condition δ. Parameter µ1 and µ2 measures to
which extent the fuel efficiency help in addressing pollution caused by fuel consump-
tion. For simplicity, we assume µ1 and µ2 to unity.
Chapter 3
Optimal Environmental Taxation
in the Presence of Pollution and
Congestion: A General
Equilibrium Analysis
This chapter derives the optimal steady-state first-best environmental tax structure
in the presence of (i) different vintage vehicles (new vehicles and old vehicles), (ii)
pollution and congestion externalities caused by vehicle driving. Analytical results
show that the optimal fuel tax is determined by two opposing forces caused by
gasoline consumption: marginal cost of pollution and marginal cost of congestion.
We also find that the optimal road taxes depend on the gasoline consumption ratio
between the new cars and the old cars. We further derive the solution of a uniform
fuel tax and examine how that affects the optimal road taxes accordingly. Our
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calibration on the U.S. economy shows that the optimal levels of transport taxes
are affected by the households’ preferences on the environmental factors. In the
presence of congestion externality, optimal fuel tax for old vehicles is higher, which
shows that the marginal cost of pollution outweighs the marginal cost of congestion
when households start to value the environmental quality. When we implement
uniform fuel tax, fuel tax rate lies between the optimal fuel taxes for new vehicles
and old vehicles. We also find that long-run utility is higher under optimal fuel tax
than uniform fuel tax but not to a substantial extent.
3.1 Introduction
Fuel consumed during driving creates externalities through air pollution, congestion,
accidents and import dependence (Haughton and Sarkar, 1996). The guaranteeing
of the efficiency of a competitive process and ways to address the externalities have
been important issues for economic policy construction. Environmental taxes, inter-
nalizing the external costs which vehicle driving imposes on the rest of the society,
have been a popular policy tool to address externalities (Bovenberg and De Mooij,
1994). However, what we observe is that fuels are taxed at widely different rates
in different countries (Newbery, 2005), with the U.K. in particular standing out as
having high oil taxes in contrast to the U.S. being specifically low in its oil taxes
among all the OECD countries (OECD, 2018). This raises a curious question as to
the appropriateness of the environmental taxes set by different countries.
This paper focuses on two important externalities generated by fuel via driving.
The first external impact is pollution which is viewed as a byproduct of gasoline
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combustion during driving. The emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and
monoxide pose great threats to residents especially in urban areas. The latter two
are the main cause for smog while carbon dioxide accumulates and contributes to
greenhouse effect which might contributes to global warming (Haughton and Sarkar,
1996). Poor air quality causes 40,000 to 50,000 early deaths in the U.K. and the cost
of these health impacts is estimated at £20 billion every year. The World Health
Organization (WHO) calculates that people in the U.K. are 64 times as likely to
die of air pollution as those in Sweden and twice as likely as those in the U.S. 1.
The second externality caused by driving is congestion. Gasoline is mainly used in
motor vehicles (Haughton and Sarkar, 1996) and the more often households drive
their vehicles, the heavier the traffic. In the U.K., traffic congestion in largest cities
is 14% worse than it was five years ago2. Many studies have shown that there
is a strong link between air pollution and congestion caused by vehicle driving.
Traffic congestion drastically worsens the air quality. In nose-to-tail traffic, tailpipe
emissions are four times greater than they are in free flow traffic (Bell, 2006). During
periods of heavy traffic, the falling speed of the traffic worsens air pollution. Morning
peak traffic average speeds in central London have fallen from 16 kmph in 2006 to
12 kmph in 2016, causing a 10% increase in NOx from diesel cars and vans, and a
25% and 27% increase for buses and trucks3.
Governments have recognized the need to tackle traffic congestion and different
policies have been put in practice4. Among all the tools, it is widely believed that
1 World Health Statistics, Monitoring Health for the SDGs, World Health Organisation, 2017.
2 Travel in London Report 9, Transport for London 2016.
3 Travel in London Report 9, Transport for London 2016.
4 Since 2008 Summer Olympics, Beijing started a license plate rationing scheme whereby each
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economic incentives bring about a more efficient allocation of road space and natural
resources (Walters, 1961).
A number of previous empirical studies have attempted different ways to quantify
the external costs generated5 and most of their estimation being mileage based.
Parry and Small (2005) build up a static analytical framework and solve for tje
second-best optimal fuel tax and decompose it into components that reflect different
external costs. They then calibrate their model based on the U.K. and the U.S.
economies to explain why different countries have different fuel tax rates. However,
there are still limitations within the previous research. Firstly, congestion itself
cannot be fully addressed by only taxing fuel. Congestion is normally measured by
the time spent on the road. Driving time is determined as the inverse of average
travel speed times mileage of travel (Parry and Small, 2005). As agents normally
take average driving speed as a given, the higher the mileage of travel, the longer
time agents have to spend on the road, hence heavier traffic. Mileage of travel is
produced by different fuel-efficiency-level of cars and gasoline. Therefore, simply
by charging higher price on fuel would not fully solve the congestion externality.
Secondly, it is crucial to take into consideration of the endogeniety of fuel efficiency.
As fuel becomes more expensive, households respond to this by either driving more
fuel-efficient vehicles or driving less, which means that fuel economy of the vehicle
car is banned from urban core area one workday per week, depending on the last digit of its licence
plate. In 2003, a congestion fee for driving in London was introduced and that year it was reported
that the scheme resulted in a 10% reduction in traffic volumes and an overall reduction of 11% in
vehicle kilometres in London.
5 See Peirson et al. (1995), Mayeres et al. (1996), and Rothengatter and Mauch (2000).
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fleet matter. Thirdly, fuel efficiency progresses over time and more fuel-efficient
vehicles contributes less emissions thus lower pollution level. To capture the long-
run impact of policy on environment, the contribution of a static model is very much
diminished.
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature in several ways. First, to
fully tackle the external cost generated by vehicle driving, we examine the first-best
environmental taxes to address pollution and congestion externalities separately.
We then examine the interrelation between optimal environmental taxes and how
they affect optimal tax structure. Second, we introduce capital heterogeneity using
”putty clay” technology (see Cooley et al. (1997) and Solow et al. (1960a)) to model
vehicles of different vintage so as to better capture the impact of fuel efficiency
endogeneity on optimal environmental taxes. Third, a dynamic view is useful in
interpreting pollution externalities as emissions accumulate over time and impact
agents in the long-run. This paper examines the first-best optimal environmental
taxes (fuel taxes and road taxes) employing a two-period vintage dynamic general
equilibrium model with pollution and congestion externalities presented.
We summarize the results as follows. First, analytical results show that the first-
best optimal fuel taxes consist of two parts: marginal cost of pollution and marginal
cost of congestion. New cars generate less pollution but contribute more to the
mileage of travel which leads to more congestion. Thus, the optimal fuel taxes of
different types of vehicles depend on these two contradicting factors. Optimal road
taxes target at the congestion externality which is related to vehicle fuel efficiency
level. In the steady states, households prefer to drive new cars more often which
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implies higher mileage of travel, thus road tax is higher for new cars than old cars.
We further solve for uniform fuel tax and it takes the form of weighted average
of fuel taxes of new cars and old cars. Second, we calibrate our model based on
the U.S. economy and show that the optimal environmental taxes depend on the
households’ preferences on environmental factors. In the presence of congestion
externality, optimal fuel tax for old vehicles is higher when households start to value
environment which shows that the marginal cost of pollution outweighs the marginal
cost of congestion. Households are better off under optimal fuel tax than uniform
fuel tax but not to a substantial extent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model. Section
3.4 solves the social planner’s problem and describes its dynamics while section 3.3
looks at the decentralized economy case. Section 3.5 and 3.6 present the environ-
mental taxes solutions (fuel taxes and road taxes). Section 3.7 describes calibration
and numerically present the environmental taxes under different sets of preference
parameters. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Basic features of the model
In this section, we introduce how vehicle-related features are modelled before we
present the social planner’s problem and household’s problem to solve for the optimal
environmental taxes.
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3.2.1 Driving behavior
Driving service is composed of mileage of travel produced by both new and old cars:
Mt = (m
σ
t,1 +m
σ
t,2)
1
σ , (3.2.1)
where 0 < σ < 1 and it measures the price elasticity of demand.
mt,1 measures the mileage of travel of new cars and mt,2 old cars at each time
period. This setting follows Grossman and Helpman (1991) to guarantee that house-
holds prefer to drive both types of cars rather than just the new ones.
At each time period, the mileage of travel by the new cars (at−1δt−1) and the old
cars(ρat−2δt−2) 6 are:
mt,1 = (at−1δt−1)γgt,1, (3.2.2)
mt,2 = (ρat−2δt−2)γgt,2, (3.2.3)
where 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
Mileage of travel has a linear relation to gasoline and depends on the efficiency
condition of the engines which are measured by γ 7. 1−ρ measures the depreciation
rate for the vehicle after having been used for a period.
3.2.2 Transport externalities
In this chapter, we include environmental factors and specifically we focus on pol-
lution and congestion caused by vehicle driving.
6 The description of vehicles is further explained in later section.
7 This formulation follows Wei (2013).
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Congestion: Parry and Small (2005) use driving time as a measurement for con-
gestion which is the product of the inverse of the average travel speed and miles of
travel. They also assume that agents take the average travel speed fixed as they
do not take account of their own impact on congestion. Following Parry and Small
(2005), we use the sum of mileages8 as a proxy for congestion externality.
Nt = mt,1 +mt,2. (3.2.4)
It captures the two sources of congestion: 1) the ownership of vehicles and 2) the
driving service when provided with gasoline. Congestion enters into utility function
for household as a negative externality (See Eq.3.3.21). In the utility function, N¯
measures the road capacity which bears the negative impact from congestion. The
figure below depicts the relation between road capacity and utility.
Figure 3.1: Congestion and road capacity
As seen from the figure, the x-axis measures road capacity(N¯ −N) while y-axis
measures the utility household gets from more spacious roads. When the roads
8Congestion is proportional to mileage and we abstract from peak hours. Congestion and
pollution are not directly affecting each other but are related through the consumption of gasoline.
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are less congested (lower N), households gains higher utility. Blue line depicts the
scenario where a higher road capacity is realised (higher N¯).
Pollution: Households gain utility from good environmental quality. However,
gasoline combustion caused by vehicle driving leads to pollution which degener-
ates environmental quality. Meanwhile, at each period, nature assimilates a certain
amount of pollutants and thus improves environment quality.
We base our formulation of pollution on Selden and Song (1995). The pollutant
we focus here is local air pollutant which is caused by the usage of gasoline but
mitigated by vehicle’s embedded fuel-efficiency levels:
Pt =
gt,1
δt−1
+
gt,2
ρδt−2
, (3.2.5)
where 1− ρ denotes the depreciation after vehicle being used for a period.
Eq.3.2.5 means that pollution is linear to gasoline consumed by both new cars
and old cars, and new cars are more efficient in mitigating pollution as the marginal
pollution caused by gasoline consumption is higher for old cars than new cars.
Environmental quality: Environmental quality is modelled as a type of asset.
The quality of the environment, Q, represents the stock of natural capital and
accumulates based on the regenerating ability of nature while depreciates due to
pollution P . Q evolves over time according to the following function based on
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995):
Qt+1 −Qt = Φ− Qt − Pt, (3.2.6)
where Qmax = Q¯ which implies that there is an upper limit for environmental quality.
Φ represents the original level of environmental quality while  denotes the nature’s
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pollutant’s assimilating rate. The law of motion shows that environmental quality
is improved each period by nature’s pollutants-assimilating ability.
3.3 Decentralized economy
Now we start to look at the scenario where we have many firms and many identical
households. Households own all factors of production and all shares in firms. Gov-
ernment in the economy collects taxes from gasoline consumption and transfers the
revenue back to households in a lump-sum payment.
3.3.1 Firms
There are two production sectors: one is the general production sector G which is
used for general consumption goods ct, accumulation of capital and the purchase of
gasoline at an exogenous price pt. The second is vehicle production sector F which
produces vehicle capital at and fuel efficiency δt.
General production
In this sector, firms hire labours lgt and rent capital k
g
t from the households to produce
consumption goods, accumulate capital and import gasoline at a fixed price with
constant-return-to-scale technology. The profits generated go back to households.
The resource constraint reads:
G(kgt , l
g
t ) = ct + kt+1 − (1− k)kt + pt(gt,1 + gt,2). (3.3.7)
The problem facing the firms in this sector is to maximize its profit (pigt ) with
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respect to capital kgt and labour l
g
t :
max
kgt ,l
g
t
pigt = G(k
g
t , l
g
t )− rgt kgt − wgt lgt . (3.3.8)
We normalize the price from the general production to unity. Given its constant-
return-to-scale technology, the profit from the general production sector pigt will be
zero.
The corresponding first-order conditions are:
rgt = Gkgt , (3.3.9)
wgt = Glgt . (3.3.10)
Vehicle production
Vehicle is a capital good made up of two attributes, the chassis of the car a and
the fuel efficiency component δ (the car engine power). Those two components are
produced separately but must be sold as a combined product. Fuel efficiency δ,
embedding clean technology, is crucial in mitigating air pollution (see Eq.3.2.5).
In this sector, firms hire labour lat and rent capital k
a
t to produce vehicle capital
at and fuel efficiency δt. The firms sell the combination of vehicle capital and fuel
efficiency to households at price qat . The resource constraint reads:
F (kat , l
a
t ) = at + µδt, (3.3.11)
where µ measures the marginal transformation rate between vehicle capital at and
fuel efficiency δt.
Firm’s goal is to maximize its profit (piat ) with respect to capital k
a
t , labour l
a
t
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and how much fuel efficiency to produce δt:
max
kat ,l
a
t ,δt
piat = q
a
t atδt − rat kat − wat lat . (3.3.12)
The first-order conditions for the vehicle producer are:
rat = q
a
t δtFkat , (3.3.13)
wat = q
a
t δtFlat , (3.3.14)
qat [F (k
a
t , l
a
t )− µδt]− µqat δt = 0. (3.3.15)
Equilibrium conditions in the production sector
To clear the production sector:
kat + k
g
t = kt, (3.3.16)
lgt + l
a
t = lt, (3.3.17)
where kt represents the total capital and lt the total labour at time period t.
wat = w
g
t = wt, (3.3.18)
rat = r
g
t = rt. (3.3.19)
3.3.2 Households
Representative household gains utility from general consumption ct, driving service
Mt, leisure 1 − lt and environmental quality Qt. They get disutility from conges-
tion Nt. We assume that the utility function is concave and is twice continuously
differentiable:
U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt). (3.3.20)
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We assume log-preferences for the utility function:
U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt) =
φ1 log ct + φ2 logMt + (1− φ1 − φ2) log (1− lt) + φ3 log (N¯ −Nt) + φ4 logQt,
(3.3.21)
where φ1, φ2, φ3 and φ4 are all positive.
Each time period, the household supplies labour lt and capital kt to firms and
receives all the profits generated by both types of firms (piat and pi
g
t ). A lump-sum
payment Tt is paid to the household from the government. The household spends
on consumption goods, gasoline, new vehicles and investment. Household is also
subject to environmental taxes: gasoline tax for new cars and old cars (τ 1t and τ
2
t )
respectively and road taxes for new cars and old cars (Tt,1 and Tt,2).
Thus, the budget constraint facing households is:
piat + pi
g
t + wtlt + rtkt = (pt + τ
1
t )gt,1 + (pt + τ
2
t )gt,2 + kt+1 − (1− k)kt + ct
+qat (atδt) + Tt,1(at−1δt−1) + Tt,2(at−2δt−2) + Tt.
(3.3.22)
The problem the household is facing is to maximize its discounted life-time util-
ity:
max
ct,gt,1,gt,2,atδt,lt
∞∑
s=0
βt+sU(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt), (3.3.23)
subject to the budget constraint shown in Eq. 3.3.22.
Note that when making decisions, household does not internalize the detrimen-
tal effects caused by vehicle driving. Put differently, household does not consider
externalities.
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We solve the maximization problem by transforming it into the equivalent Bell-
man equation format:
V t(kt, at−1δt−1, ρat−2δt−2;
{
It, Qt
}
) =
max
ct,gt,1,gt,2,atδt,lt
[
U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt) + βV t+1(kt+1, atδt, ρat−1δt−1;
{
It+1, Qt+1
}
)
]
.
(3.3.24)
The derivation of the first-order conditions and the envelope conditions are shown
in Appendix 3.9.1.
3.3.3 Government
Government levies tax on household’s purchase of gasoline and transfer the tax
revenue back to households in a lump-sum payment.
Tt = τ
1
t gt,1 + τ
2
t gt,2 + Tt,1(at−1δt−1) + Tt,2(at−2δt−2). (3.3.25)
3.4 Social planner’s problem
We now move on to solve the social planner’s problem where government allocates
the resources. The Bellman equation to government’s problem is:
V t(kt, Qt; at−1δt−1, ρat−2δt−2;
{
It
}
) =
max
ct,gt,1,gt,2,at,l
g
t ,lt,k
g
t ,kt
[
U(ct,Mt, 1−lt, Nt, Qt)+βV t+1(kt+1, Qt+1; atδt, ρat−1δt−1;
{
It+1
}
)
]
,
(3.4.26)
subject to the resource constraints:
G(kgt , l
g
t ) = ct + kt+1 − (1− k)kt + pt(gt,1 + gt,2),
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F (kat , l
a
t ) = at + µδt,
and environmental quality’s law of motion:
Qt+1 −Qt = Φ− Qt − Pt.
The resource constraint (Eq.3.3.11) and the equilibrium condition (Eq.3.3.16) imply
that:
δt = H(kt − kgt , lt − lgt , at).
The optimality conditions are derived in Appendix 3.9.2.
3.5 Optimal environmental taxes
3.5.1 Optimal gasoline taxes
Taxes are used to correctly price social activities causing externalities, i.e. pollution
and congestion. Gasoline taxes help prices closely approximate marginal social cost,
that is, the gasoline tax household has to pay should equate exactly to the marginal
social cost caused by gasoline consumption so as to achieve first best. Given that
we have different types of vehicles, different and specific gasoline taxes need to be
applied. Thus, using optimality conditions we obtained in both household’s problem
and social planner’s problem, we are able to equalize the marginal social cost and
the tax.
Eq.3.A.2 and Eq.3.A.11 render the optimal gasoline tax rate for new cars:
τ 1t =
V t+1Qt+1
V t+1kt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
−
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
βV t+1kt+1
. (3.5.27)
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Similarly, Eq.3.A.3 and Eq. 3.A.12 give us the optimal gasoline tax rate for old
cars:
τ 2t =
V t+1Qt+1
V t+1kt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,2
−
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
βV t+1kt+1
. (3.5.28)
The formulation of optimal gasoline taxes reveal that gasoline consumption con-
tributes to both pollution and congestion. To see which rate is higher, in the steady
state, τ 2 − τ 1 become:
τ 2 − τ 1 =
+
VQ
Vk
+
(
1
ρδ
− 1
δ
) +
−
UN
βVk
+
[(aδ)γ − (ρaδ)γ]. (3.5.29)
Thus, in the steady state, the magnitude of the gasoline tax is undetermined
analytically. It depends on the opposing factors between marginal cost of pollution
and marginal cost of congestion caused by gasoline consumption. New cars cause
less pollution given the same amount of gasoline consumed but they do provide more
mileage of travel which contribute more to congestion. It is clear thus when only
environmental quality is considered, gasoline tax for old cars is higher than new
ones. Similarly, when only congestion externality is considered, gasoline tax for new
cars is higher than old cars. When both types of externalities are considered, the
tax rate depends on the dominating factor.
3.5.2 Optimal road taxes
Road taxes are used to correct congestion externalities. Compare the value functions
from social planner’s problem and decentralized economy, we obtain:
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
= −βV t+1kt+1T1, (3.5.30)
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and
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
= −βV t+1kt+1T2. (3.5.31)
The equations above then render the solutions to the optimal road taxes:
T1 = −
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
βV t+1kt+1
, (3.5.32)
and
T2 = −
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
βV t+1kt+1
. (3.5.33)
It is straightforward in the formulation that vehicles as a type of capital only
contribute to congestion externality and the tax rate is exactly determined by the
amount of marginal social damage. Similarly, in the steady state, we want to see
the comparison between marginal congestion cost of new cars and old cars:
T1 − T2 = UN
βVk
γ(aδ)γ−1(ργ−1g2 − g1). (3.5.34)
We can see that the result is undetermined and depends on the gasoline consumption
ratio between new cars and old cars. When the gasoline consumption ratio between
two types of vehicles g1
g2
> ργ−1, then the road tax for new cars should be higher
than the road tax for old cars and vice versa.
3.6 Uniform gasoline tax
Levying different gasoline tax rates based on the type of vehicles is a difficult policy
to implement9. Thus, we are interested in finding how environmental taxes change
when gasoline tax is taxed uniformly across different types of vehicles.
9 This reflects the practice of fuel taxes in many countries.
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3.6.1 Optimal uniform gasoline tax
To have uniform gasoline tax, the left hand side of Eq.3.A.2 and Eq.3.A.3 must be
forced to be the same. Thus, we have:
UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
= UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
mt,2
∂gt,2
,
which gives us the condition on gasoline consumption ratio:
gt,1 = (
at−1δt−1
ρat−2δt−2
)
γσ
1−σ gt,2 = (
ρat−2δt−2
at−1δt−1
)
γσ
σ−1 gt,2. (3.6.35)
We can express it in a general form:
gt,1 = Φ(at−1δt−1, ρat−2δt−2)gt,2. (3.6.36)
We now solve the social planner’s problem by putting this ratio in as a new
constraint which means that gt,1 is not going to be a choice variable.
Notice that under the new constraint, both the change in at−1δt−1 and ρat−2δt−2
affect the change in g1.Thus, the envelope conditions Eq.3.A.19 and Eq.3.A.20
change as well.
V t(at−1δt−1) = UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ ρβV t+1(ρat−1δt−1)[
UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
− β(ptV t+1kt+1 + V t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
)
]
∂gt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
,
(3.6.37)
V t(ρat−2δt−2) = UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)[
UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
− β(ptV t+1kt+1 + V t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
)
]
∂gt,1
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
,
(3.6.38)
3.6. Uniform gasoline tax 59
while all the other first-order conditions remain the same (See Appendix 3.9.3 for
derivation of constrained social planner’s problem.).
Now we can solve the uniform gasoline tax. For household in the decentralized
economy, they still make decisions separately on the consumption of gasoline (g1 and
g2). However, they are now facing a uniform tax τt on gasoline in stead of separate
ones.
Thus, Eq.3.A.2 and Eq.3.A.3 change into:
UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
= βV t+1kt+1(pt + τt), (3.6.39)
UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
= βV t+1kt+1(pt + τt). (3.6.40)
Substitute these into Eq. 3.A.27, we get:
βV t+1kt+1(pt + τt)gt,2 + UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
gt,2 − β
(
ptV
t+1
kt+1
+ V t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,2
)
gt,2
+ βV t+1kt+1(pt + τt)gt,1 + UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
gt,1 − β
(
ptV
t+1
kt+1
+ V t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
)
gt,1 = 0,
which renders the solution for uniform tax rate:
τt =
gt,2
gt,1 + gt,2
τ 2t +
gt,1
gt,1 + gt,2
τ 1t . (3.6.41)
The uniform gasoline tax rate takes the form of a weighted average of the gasoline
tax rates for new cars and old cars.
3.6.2 Optimal road taxes under the constraint
Given that the new gasoline consumption ratio is in place, road taxes for new cars
and old cars change accordingly as well. We match Eq.3.A.8 with Eq.3.6.37, and
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Eq.3.A.9 with Eq.3.6.38 to get the adjusted road use taxes:
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+
[
βV t+1kt+1τt + UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
− βV t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
]
∂gt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
= −βV t+1kt+1T c1 . (3.6.42)
Similarly, match Eq.3.A.20 and Eq.3.A.9, we get:
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
+
[
βV t+1kt+1τt + UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
− βV t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
]
∂gt,1
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
= −βV t+1kt+1T c2 . (3.6.43)
T c1 and T
c
2 denote road use taxes under constrained condition for new cars and
old cars.
Eq.3.5.27 implies that:
βV t+1kt+1τt = βV
t+1
Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
− UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
.
Substitute the above equation into the two expressions above, we get:
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ βV t+1kt+1(τt − τ 1t )
∂gt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
= −βV t+1kt+1T1,
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
+ βV t+1kt+1(τt − τ 1t )
∂gt,1
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
= −βV t+1kt+1T2.
Dividing −βV t+1kt+1 on both sides of the above equations, we get the formulas for
the road taxes under the gasoline consumption ratio constraint:
T c1 = −
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
βV t+1kt+1
− (τt − τ 1t )
∂gt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
, (3.6.44)
T c2 = −
UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
βV t+1kt+1
− (τt − τ 1t )
∂gt,1
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
. (3.6.45)
With Eq. 3.5.32 and Eq.3.5.33, we can rearrange the expressions for the optimal
road taxes into:
T c1 = T1 − (τt − τ 1t )
∂gt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
, (3.6.46)
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T c2 = T2 − (τt − τ 1t )
∂gt,1
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
. (3.6.47)
Therefore, the road taxes under uniform gasoline tax contain two parts: the
original expression of road tax and the extra term which measures the marginal
change made to gasoline consumption when vehicle types change. We are interested
to know whether the new road taxes level are above or below the original level.
Given Eq.3.6.41, Eq.3.5.27 and Eq.3.5.28, we obtain τ 2 − τ 1 in the steady state:
τ 2 − τ 1 =
+
VQ
Vk
+
(
1
ρδ
− 1
δ
) +
−
UN
βVk
+
[(aδ)γ − (ρaδ)γ]. (3.6.48)
The sign of τ − τ 1 can not be determined. Thus, it still remains unknown
analytically whether the road taxes under new constraint are above or below the ones
without. To have a better picture of the tax rates and their interactions among each
other under the gasoline consumption constraint, numerical simulation is needed.
3.7 Numerical solutions to the optimal environ-
mental taxes
In this section, we employ a numerical model based on the U.S. economy to examine
the first-best optimal environmental taxes. Calibrated model helps to relax the
restrictions of the analytical model and assesses the economy in a more realistic
setting. The calibration mostly follows the benchmark calibration we did in the first
chapter with only a few changes.
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3.7.1 Calibration
The table below summarizes the values of parameter in the calibration. The main
change happens in household preference and environmental factor.
Category Parameters Description Notation Value
Driving Service Vehicle leftover rate ρ 0.9
Vehicle preference σ 0.5
Mileage production technology γ 0.5
Production Technology Capital depreciation rate k 0.1
Capital share in production α1,α2 0.33/0.42
Productivity level A1, A2 1
Marginal transformation rate µ 1
Gasoline price pt 1.0872
Household Preference Subjective discount rate β 0.97
Weight on consumption φ1 0.34
Weight on driving φ2 0.05
Weight on environmental quality φ4 1
Marginal cost of congestion φ3 0.0127
Environmental Factor Natural purifying capacity  0.01
Initial stock of environmental quality Φ 10
Congestion Extreme N¯ 1
Table 3.1: Calibration
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Household Preference
We assumed log-preference for the household as shown in Eq. 3.3.21:
U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt) =
φ1 log ct + φ2 logMt + (1− φ1 − φ2) log (1− lt) + φ3 log (N¯ −Nt) + φ4 logQt.
At each time period, household gains utility from consumption ct, driving Mt and
leisure 1 − lt. Household also benefits from environmental quality Qt and suffers
from congestion Nt. Parameter φ1 and φ2 are calibrated to 0.34 and 0.05 following
Wei (2013) to match the fraction of time spent on market activities. How house-
holds value environmental quality is mostly geographically determined. We set the
benchmark value to 1 to match with the city center scenario (Jackson, 1983).
Congestion arises because additional vehicles reduce the speed of other vehicles,
and hence increase households’ driving time. The average driving speed is a constant
given that the road condition is fairly good. Therefore, an increase in aggregate
vehicle miles of travel implies more congestion. The marginal cost of congestion to
household is measured by φ3. Based on Newbery (1990), we calibrate the congestion
cost to be 0.0127 10.
Environmental factor
Environmental quality, as shown in Eq.3.2.6, is a stock variable which changes over
time based on the pollution caused by vehicle driving.  measures the natural
10 The formula for estimating marginal congestion cost comes from Department of Trans-
port(US).
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pollutant-absorbing ability and we set it to 0.01. Φ denotes the beginning level of
environmental quality and we set it to 10.
3.7.2 Optimal environmental taxes
As shown in Eq.3.5.27 and Eq.3.5.28, gasoline is involved in generating both type of
externalities. Old cars should be taxed more for generating more pollution while new
cars should be taxed more for causing more traffic. We start from the benchmark
calibration where household do not get affected by externalities (φ3 = 0, φ4 = 0).
We then change the preference value of congestion (φ3) and environmental quality
(φ4) to see its impact on optimal tax rates.
Table 3.2 shows the benchmark scenario where households do not take external-
ities into consideration (thus the preferences for congestion φ3 and environmental
quality φ4 are zero). The optimal gasoline taxes (τ
1 and τ 2) and optimal road taxes
(T1 and T2) are all zero. Households use new cars more often and therefore new
cars provide higher mileage of travel (m1 > m2). New cars consume more gasoline
than old ones (g1 > g2). Households do not pay for road use taxes and only pay for
gasoline at its original price pt. Next, we are going to include pollution externality
into household’s preference to see how the economy is going to change from the
benchmark scenario.
Table 3.3 shows the economy when household cares only about pollution and
thus congestion is excluded (φ3 = 0, φ4 = 0.34). Road taxes for both types of
vehicles are still zero as congestion does not concern household. As only pollution
externality is considered and new cars have a higher pollution mitigating ability
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Benchmark: no externality
Economy in the Steady State
Variable Description Value Variable Description Value
c consumption 0.3676 a vehicle capital 0.1508
g1 gasoline (new cars) 0.0255 δ vehicle efficiency 0.1508
g2 gasoline (old cars) 0.0242 l
a labour (vehicle production) 0.0039
kg capital (general production) 1.4770 lg labour(general production) 0.3716
ka capital (vehicle production) 0.1657 l total labour 0.3755
k total capital 1.6427 P pollution 0.3474
Optimal Environmental Taxation
τ 1 optimal fuel tax (new cars) 0 τ 2 optimal fuel tax (old cars) 0
T1 optimal road tax (new cars) 0 T2 optimal road tax (old cars) 0
Mileage of Travel
m1 mileage travel by new cars 0.0039
m2 mileage travel by old cars 0.0035
Travel Cost
(pt + τ
1)g1 gasoline cost for new cars 0.0277
(pt + τ
2)g2 gasoline cost for old cars 0.0263
T1(aδ) road tax cost for new cars 0
T2(aδ) road tax cost for old cars 0
qa vehicle price 1.1353
qaaδ vehicle purchase cost 0.0258
Table 3.2: Optimal environmental taxes and economy (benchmark calibration)
than old cars, Eq.3.5.27 and Eq.3.5.28 indicate that the optimal gasoline tax rate
should be higher for old cars. This is further demonstrated by numerical results
as the gasoline tax for new cars is $0.1205/gallon and $0.1339/gallon for old cars.
Compared to the benchmark scenario where households ignore both externalities
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Pollution externality only
Economy in the steady state
Variable Description Value Variable Description Value
c consumption 0.3694 a vehicle capital 0.1512
g1 gasoline (new cars) 0.0232 δ vehicle efficiency 0.1512
g2 gasoline (old cars) 0.0215 la labour (vehicle production) 0.0039
kg capital (general production) 1.4649 lg labour (general production) 0.3686
ka capital (vehicle production) 0.1665 l total labour 0.3725
k total capital 1.6315 P pollution 0.3117
Optimal Environmental Taxation
τ 1 optimal fuel tax (new cars) 0.1205 τ 2 optimal fuel tax (old cars) 0.1339
T1 optimal road tax (new cars) 0 T2 optimal road tax (old cars) 0
Mileage of Travel
m1 mileage travel by new cars 0.0035
m2 mileage travel by old cars 0.0031
Travel Cost
(pt + τ
1)g1 gasoline cost for new cars 0.0280
(pt + τ
2)g2 gasoline cost for old cars 0.0263
T1(aδ) road tax cost for new cars 0
T2(aδ) road tax cost for old cars 0
qa vehicle price 1.1353
qaaδ vehicle purchase cost 0.0260
Table 3.3: Optimal environmental taxes and economy: pollution externality only
(see Table 3.2), gasoline consumption decreases for both types of vehicles but to a
different extent. New cars’ gasoline consumption decreases by 9% while old cars’
gasoline consumption decreases by 11%. However, new cars still consume more
gasoline and new cars provide more mileage of travel than old ones. Fuel efficiency
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and vehicle capital increases and pollution decreases. Households still prefer to use
new cars than old ones.
0 0.5 1
0.368
0.37
0.372
Consumption
consumption
0 0.5 1
0.365
0.37
0.375
Labour Supply
l
lg
0 0.5 1
1.4
1.5
1.6
Capital Utilization
k
kg
0 0.5 1
2.5
3
3.5
4
10
-3 Mileage
m
1
m
2
0 0.5 1
0.25
0.3
0.35
Pollution
P
0 0.5 1
4
0.1505
0.151
0.1515
Fuel Efficiency
a/
0 0.5 1
4
0.018
0.02
0.022
0.024
Gasoline Consumption
g
1
g
2
Figure 3.2: Optimal fuel taxes: the economy when preference for environment
varies
We then examine the scenario where both externalities are concerned but house-
hold’s preference for environmental quality (φ4) varies. Figure 3.2 shows how eco-
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nomic variables are endogenously affected in the long run given different preferences
on the environmental quality, ranging from zero to one. As the weight given to
the environment increases, the marginal benefit gained from improving environment
increases which induces consumers to switch their demand from driving towards
consumption and leisure, which explains the positive increment in consumption and
decline in labour supply. Gasoline consumption thus decreases for both type of
vehicle and the drop for old cars is slightly bigger than for the new ones. Pollu-
tion decreases as a result of the decreasing gasoline consumption and vehicle service
usage.
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Figure 3.3: Optimal environmental taxation with different preference for environ-
mental quality
Figure 3.3 shows the corresponding optimal fuel taxes and road taxes when φ4
varies. Fuel taxes, as we discussed before in the analytical solution (Eq.3.5.27 and
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Eq.3.5.28), depend on two contradicting factors: marginal cost of pollution and
marginal cost of congestion caused by fuel consumption. New cars are more envi-
ronmentally friendly but also contribute more to the traffic for being more efficient
in providing mileage of travel. Numerical simulation suggests that, when both ex-
ternalities are considered, the pollution mitigation ability dominates the congestion
cost as household starts to care more and more about the environment. Old cars,
therefore, are facing higher fuel tax than new cars. Optimal road taxes, as discussed
before (Eq.3.5.32 and Eq.3.5.33), depend on the gasoline consumption ratio. As
household cares more about environment, gasoline consumed by old cars decreases
faster which makes gasoline consumption ratio increase. New cars provide more
mileage of travel to household which implies more congestion. Therefore, road tax
is higher for new cars than old cars.
3.7.3 Uniform gasoline tax
Levying different gasoline taxes based on vehicle type is difficult to implement in
practice. We therefore solve for uniform gasoline tax under the fuel consumption
ratio between new cars and old cars (Eq.3.6.41). We obtain the solution to social
planner’s problem under the constraint of gasoline consumption ratio (Eq.3.6.35).
in the steady state, the constraint reduces to:
g1 = ρ
γσ
σ−1 g2. (3.7.49)
Under bench mark calibration, the gasoline ratio g1
g2
= ρ
γσ
σ−1 > 1, which means
that new cars consume more gasoline than old cars. We then focus on the scenario
where household takes both externalities into consideration, solve for the uniform
3.7. Numerical solutions to the optimal environmental taxes 70
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.368
0.369
0.37
0.371
0.372
Consumption
consumption
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.365
0.37
0.375
Labour Supply
l
lg
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1.4
1.45
1.5
1.55
1.6
Capital Utilization
k
kg
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
2.5
3
3.5
4
10-3 Mileage
m
1
m
2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.25
0.3
0.35
Pollution
P
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
4
0.1508
0.151
0.1512
0.1514
0.1516
Fuel Efficiency
a/
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
4
0.018
0.02
0.022
0.024
0.026
Gasoline Consumption
g
1
g
2
Figure 3.4: Uniform fuel tax: the economy when preference for environment varies
fuel tax and compare it to the optimal fuel taxes in the previous case. Table 3.A.2
describes the economy in the steady state in the presence of both externalities with
varying preferences for environment quality. The gasoline consumption ratio con-
straint is very close to the optimal tax scenario, thus when the preference for the
environment varies, the change of the economic variables in the steady state follows
the same pattern (See Figure 3.4). As people care more about the environment, the
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increasing marginal damage from pollution makes household switch their demand
towards consumption and leisure. We do observe that instead of gasoline consumed
by old cars decreasing more, the gasoline consumption ratio keeps constant as shown
in Eq.3.7.49.
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Figure 3.5: Uniform fuel tax and the corresponding road taxes with different
preference for enviromental quality
The uniform fuel tax and corresponding road use taxes are shown in Figure 3.5.
As shown in Eq.3.6.41, uniform fuel tax takes the form of a weighted average of
fuel tax for new cars and old cars and thus uniform tax lies in between the two
first-best fuel taxes. Figure 3.5 shows that as preference for environment grows,
3.7. Numerical solutions to the optimal environmental taxes 72
uniform gasoline tax increases and lies between fuel tax for new cars and old cars.
Road taxes, based on calibration, are the same for both new cars and old cars and
keep decreasing when households value the environment more.
3.7.4 Welfare
In this section, we compare the welfare status under optimal gasoline taxes and
uniform gasoline tax. The difference between the optimal gasoline taxes for different
types of vehicles and uniform gasoline tax is that we impose the gasoline consumption
ratio. Given that the gasoline ratio constraint is quite close to what we have in the
optimal fuel tax scenario, we do not observe huge differences in economy in the
long-run, which means that the welfare does not vary too much.
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Figure 3.6: Utility difference and consumption change under optimal fuel taxes
and uniform fuel tax
As shown in Figure 3.6, households are better off under optimal gasoline taxes
but not to a large extent. As preference for environmental quality increases, the
utility difference gap between the two policy options widens. We also solve for the
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consumption equivalence for one percentage improvement in environmental qual-
ity. Households gain utility from consumption c, driving service M , leisure 1 − l
and environmental quality Q while they suffer from congestion externality N . The
percentage change of consumption dc
c
is expressed as:
dc
c
= −φ4
φ1
dQ
Q
. (3.7.50)
The expression depends on the preference ratio between consumption and en-
vironmental quality. We look at the equivalent percentage change of consumption
when environmental quality changes:
Consumption percentage change
φ4 = 0.1 φ4 = 0.34 φ4 = 1
dQ/Q 6.2085e-06 1.7547e-05 3.08e-05
dc/c -1.8260e-06 -1.7547e-05 -9.0591e-05
Table 3.4: Consumption equivalence when environmental quality improves
Table 3.4 describes how much consumption household is willing to sacrifice in
order to have environmental quality improved. As households value environment
more, they are willing to sacrifice more consumption.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper employs analytical and numerical models to examine the general equi-
librium interactions between gasoline taxes and road taxes to account for the exter-
nalities caused by vehicle driving: pollution and congestion.
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The analytical model extends earlier work in many aspects. First, earlier work
mainly focuses on gasoline tax and tries to only use gasoline tax to address all
the externalities caused by gasoline consumption while neglecting the interaction
among different environmental taxes. The model we built focuses on the externali-
ties (pollution and congestion) caused by vehicle driving and we introduce different
environmental taxes targeting at specific externalities. Second, we look into how
tax rates differ when it comes to vehicles of different vintages.
This model indicates that in the presence of pollution and congestion, optimal
fuel taxes depend on two contradicting powers: the marginal cost of pollution and
marginal cost of congestion. New cars are more efficient in mitigating pollution but
contribute more to traffic given its efficiency in providing mileage of travel. Old cars
emit more pollutants but people are less willing to use them. Optimal road taxes
depend on gasoline consumption ratio. We also solve for the environmental taxes
when uniform fuel tax is implemented. Our model suggests that the uniform fuel
tax is a weighted average of the first-best fuel taxes. Road taxes are undetermined
due to the gasoline consumption ratio imposed.
The numerical simulations based on the U.S. economy support the analytical
result. When households are concerned with both pollution and congestion, the
marginal cost of pollution outweighs the marginal cost of congestion as households
value environment more and more which leads to the optimal fuel tax for old cars
being higher than for new ones. Under central values for parameters, gasoline con-
sumption ratio between new cars and old cars is larger than one which indicates that
road tax for new cars is higher. When implementing uniform fuel tax, we find that
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the gasoline consumption ratio is very close to the first-best case which indicates
that the change of economic status is quite small. Numerical analysis shows that
the uniform fuel tax is the weighted average of first-best fuel taxes and road taxes
are the same for both new cars and old cars under the benchmark calibration.
In addition, we also analyse the welfare level under both optimal fuel taxes and
uniform fuel tax. Given that the gasoline consumption restraint is very close to first-
best scenario, household is only slightly better off in optimal fuel taxes case and the
consumption equivalence change is also quite small. These considerations suggest
that estimates of optimal fuel tax should also take other environmental taxes into
consideration as they are intrinsically interdependent.
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3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Optimality conditions derivation to household’s prob-
lem
The first-order conditions are:
ct : Uc = βV
t+1
kt+1
, (3.A.1)
gt,1 : UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
= βV t+1kt+1(pt + τ
1
t ), (3.A.2)
gt,2 : UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
= βV t+1kt+1(pt + τ
2
t ), (3.A.3)
atδt : q
a
t V
t+1
kt+1
= V t+1atδt , (3.A.4)
lt : U1−lt = −wtβV t+1kt+1 . (3.A.5)
Similarly, we could get the envelope conditions:
V tkt = β(1− k + rt)V t+1kt+1 , (3.A.6)
VQt = UQt + β(1 + )V
t+1
Qt+1
, (3.A.7)
V t(at−1δt−1) = UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ ρβV t+1(ρat−1δt−1) − βV t+1kt+1T1, (3.A.8)
V t(ρat−2δt−2) = UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
− βV t+1kt+1T2. (3.A.9)
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3.9.2 Optimality conditions derivation to government’s prob-
lem
The first-order conditions read:
ct : Uc = βV
t+1
kt+1
, (3.A.10)
gt,1 : UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
= β
(
ptV
t+1
kt+1
+ V t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
)
, (3.A.11)
gt,2 : UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
= β
(
ptV
t+1
kt+1
+ V t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,2
)
, (3.A.12)
at : βV
t+1
atδt
(
δt + at
∂H
∂at
)
= 0, (3.A.13)
lgt : β
[
V t+1kt+1
∂G
∂lgt
− V t+1atδt at
∂H
∂(lt − lgt )
]
= 0, (3.A.14)
lt : U1−lt = βV
t+1
atδt
at
∂H
∂(lt − lgt )
, (3.A.15)
kgt : V
t+1
kt+1
(
∂G
∂kgt
)
− V t+1atδt
[
at
∂H
∂(kt − kgt )
]
= 0. (3.A.16)
Envelope conditions:
V tkt = βV
t+1
kt+1
(1− k) + βV t+1atδt at
∂H
∂(kt − kgt )
, (3.A.17)
V tQt = UQ + βV
t+1
Qt+1
(1 + ), (3.A.18)
V t(at−1δt−1) = UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ ρβV t+1(ρat−1δt−1),
(3.A.19)
V t(ρat−2δt−2) = UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
. (3.A.20)
3.9.3 Constrained social planner’s problem
We need to guarantee that the first order conditions and envelope conditions measure
the same marginal changes for social planner under the gasoline constraint. We set
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up a constrained social planner problem to see whether the marginal changes match
with what we come up with above.
The objective function for social planner is the same with Eq.3.4.26:
V t(kt, Qt; at−1δt−1, ρat−2δt−2;
{
It
}
) =
max
ct,gt,1,gt,2,at,l
g
t ,lt,k
g
t ,kt
[
U(ct,Mt, 1−lt, Nt, Qt)+βV t+1(kt+1, Qt+1; atδt, ρat−1δt−1;
{
It+1
}
)
]
,
(3.A.21)
subject to:
G(kgt , l
g
t ) = ct + kt+1 − (1− k)kt + pt(gt,1 + gt,2), (3.A.22)
F (kat , l
a
t ) = at + µδt, (3.A.23)
Qt+1 −Qt = Φ− Qt − Pt, (3.A.24)
gt,1 = Ψ(at−1δt−1, ρat−1δt−2)gt,2. (3.A.25)
Thus, the corresponding first-order conditions are:
ct : Uct = βV
t+1
kt+1
, (3.A.26)
gt,2 : UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
∂gt,1
∂gt,2
+ UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
∂gt,1
∂gt,2
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
= β
[
V t+1kt+1pt(Ψ + 1) + V
t+1
Qt+1
(
∂Pt
∂gt,2
+
∂Pt
∂gt,1
∂gt,1
∂gt,2
)
]
,
(3.A.27)
at : βV
t+1
atδt
(δt + at
∂H
∂at
) = 0, (3.A.28)
lgt : β
[
V t+1kt+1
∂G
∂lgt
− V t+1atδt at
∂H
∂(lt − lgt )
]
= 0, (3.A.29)
lt : U1−lt = βV
t+1
atδt
at
∂H
∂(lt − lgt )
, (3.A.30)
kgt : βV
t+1
kt+1
∂G
∂kgt
− βV t+1atδt at
∂H
∂(kt − kgt )
= 0. (3.A.31)
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And the envelope conditions:
V tkt = βV
t+1
kt+1
(1− k) + βVatδtat
∂H
∂(kt − kgt )
, (3.A.32)
V tQt = UQt + βV
t+1
Qt+1
(1 + ), (3.A.33)
V t(at−1δt−1) = UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
∂gt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
∂gt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
+ ρβV t+1ρat−1δt−1 − βV t+1kt+1pt
∂gt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
− βV t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
∂gt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
,
(3.A.34)
V t(ρat−2δt−2) = UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
∂gt,1
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
+ UMt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
+ UNt
∂Nt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
− βV t+1kt+1pt
∂gt,1
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
− βV t+1Qt+1
∂Pt
∂gt,1
∂gt,1
∂(ρat−2δt−2)
.
(3.A.35)
The envelope conditions with respect to at−1δt−1, ρat−2δt−2 match with Eq. 3.6.37
and Eq.3.6.38.
3.9.4 Steady state solution
Equations describing the economy in the steady states are:
A1(k
g)α1(lg)1−α1 = c+ kk + pt(g1 + g2), (3.A.36)
ka + kg = k, (3.A.37)
la + lg = l, (3.A.38)
µδ = A2(k
a)α2la
1
2
−α2 − a, (3.A.39)
Q = Φ− P, (3.A.40)
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and
Vk =
Uc
β
, (3.A.41)
UM
∂M
∂m1
∂m1
∂g1
+ UN
∂N
∂m1
∂m1
∂g1
= β(ptVk + VQ
∂P
∂g1
), (3.A.42)
UM
∂M
∂m2
∂m2
∂g2
+ UN
∂N
∂m2
∂m2
∂g2
= β(ptVk + VQ
∂P
∂g2
), (3.A.43)
a = µδ, (3.A.44)
Vk
∂G
∂lg
= Vaδa
∂H
∂la
, (3.A.45)
U1−l = βVaδa
∂H
∂la
, (3.A.46)
Vk
∂G
∂kg
= Vaδa
∂H
∂ka
, (3.A.47)
Vk = βVk(1− k) + βVaδa∂H
∂ka
, (3.A.48)
VQ = UQ + βVQ(1 + ), (3.A.49)
Vaδ = UM
∂M
∂m1
∂m1
∂(aδ)
+ UN
∂N
∂m1
∂m1
∂(aδ)
+ ρβVρaδ, (3.A.50)
Vρaδ = UM
∂M
∂m2
∂m2
∂(ρaδ)
+ UN
∂N
∂m2
∂m2
∂(ρaδ)
. (3.A.51)
Using the marginal substitution between consumption and capital, we can get
rid of Vk. We then have the marginal substitution between consumption and labour:
Uc
∂G
∂kg
= U1−l. (3.A.52)
The capital labour ratio between the two production sectors is:
∂G
∂lg
∂G
∂kg
=
∂H
∂la
∂H
∂la
. (3.A.53)
The marginal productivity of labour in general production function is expressed
as:
∂G
∂kg
=
1− β(1− k)
β
. (3.A.54)
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We get the steady state conditions:
A1(
kg
lg
)α1lg = c+ kk + pt(g1 + g2)
ka + kg = k
la + lg = l
µδ = A2(
ka
la
)α2(la)
1
2 − a
Q = Φ− P
P =
g1
δ
+
g2
ρδ
Φ2g
σ−1
1
gσ1 + ρ
γσgσ2
+
Φ3
g1 + ργg2
=
ptΦ1
c
+
β
1− β(1 + )
1
δ
Φ4
Q
Φ2ρ
γσgσ−12
gσ1 + ρ
γσgσ2
+
Φ3ρ
γ
g1 + ργg2
=
ptΦ1
c
+
β
1− β(1 + )
1
ρδ
Φ4
Q
a = µδ
(
kg
lg
)α1 =
1− Φ1 − Φ2
Φ1A1(1− α1)
c
1− l
ka
la
=
1− α1
α1
α2
1
2
− α2
kg
lg
kg
lg
=
[
1− β(1− k)
βA1α1
] 1
α1−1
[1− β(1− k)]µ
βA2α2(
1−α1
α1
)α2−
1
2 ( α21
2
−α2 )
α2− 12 (1−β(1−k)
βA1α1
)
α2− 12
α1−1 (ka)−
1
2
Φ1
βc
=
ptΦ1(g1 + βg2)
c
+
βΦ4(g1 + βg2)
(1− β(1 + ))δQ
3.9.5 Numerical results
Table 3.A.1 describes the economy when both externalities from driving are consid-
ered and the preference for environment varies.
Table 3.A.2 describes the uniform fuel tax case when both congestion and pol-
lution are considered and the preference for environment varies.
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Scenario 3: pollution and congestion (φ4 varies)
Economy in the steady state
Variable Description Value
φ4 = 0 φ4 = 0.1 φ4 = 0.34 φ4 = 1
c consumption 0.3677 0.3682 0.3694 0.3720
g1 gasoline (new cars) 0.0254 0.0247 0.0231 0.0197
g2 gasoline (old cars) 0.0241 0.0233 0.0215 0.0177
kg capital (general production) 1.4767 1.4729 1.4647 1.4472
ka capital (vehicle production) 0.1654 0.1657 0.1663 0.1675
k total capital 1.6422 1.6387 1.6310 1.6148
a vehicle capital 0.1507 0.1508 0.1511 0.1516
δ vehicle efficiency 0.1507 0.1508 0.1511 0.1516
la labour (vehicle production) 0.003906 0.003913 0.003926 0.003955
lg labour (general production) 0.3716 0.3706 0.3685 0.3641
l total labour 0.3755 0.3745 0.3725 0.3681
P pollution 0.3471 0.3358 0.3114 0.2597
Optimal Environmental Taxation
τ 1 optimal fuel tax (new cars) 0.0021 0.0376 0.1227 0.3561
τ 2 optimal fuel tax (old cars) 0.0020 0.0414 0.1360 0.3953
T1 optimal road tax (new cars) 0.0011691 0.001136 0.001064 9.0788e-04
T2 optimal road tax (old cars) 0.0011692 0.001128 0.001041 8.6048e-04
Mileage of Travel
m1 mileage travel (new cars) 0.0038 0.0037 0.0035 0.0030
m2 mileage travel (old cars) 0.0035 0.0033 0.0031 0.0025
Travel Cost
(pt + τ
1)g1 gasoline cost for new cars 0.0277 0.0278 0.0280 0.0284
(pt + τ
2)g2 gasoline cost for old cars 0.0263 0.0263 0.0263 0.0263
T1(aδ) road tax cost for new cars 2.6562e-05 2.5861e-05 2.4318e-05 2.0884e-05
T2(aδ) road tax cost for old cars 2.6566e-05 2.5685e-05 2.3792e-05 1.9793e-05
qa vehicle price 1.135329 1.135328 1.135334 1.135340
qaaδ vehicle purchase cost 0.025794 0.025835 0.025925 0.02611
Table 3.A.1: Optimal environmental taxes and economy when both externalities
considered: preference for environment varies
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Uniform Tax: pollution and congestion (φ4 varies)
Economy in the steady state
Variable Description Value
φ4 = 0 φ4 = 0.1 φ4 = 0.34 φ4 = 1
c consumption 0.3677 0.3682 0.3694 0.3720
g1 gasoline (new cars) 0.0254 0.0246 0.0229 0.0191
g2 gasoline (old cars) 0.0241 0.0234 0.0217 0.0182
kg capital (general production) 1.4767 1.4729 1.4647 1.4472
ka capital (vehicle production) 0.1654 0.1657 0.1663 0.1675
k total capital 1.6422 1.6386 1.6310 1.6147
a vehicle capital 0.1507 0.1508 0.1511 0.1516
δ vehicle efficiency 0.1507 0.1508 0.1511 0.1516
la labour (vehicle production) 0.003906 0.003913 0.003926 0.003954
lg labour (general production) 0.3716 0.3706 0.3685 0.3641
l total labour 0.3755 0.3745 0.3725 0.3681
P pollution 0.3471 0.3358 0.3116 0.2600
Optimal Environmental Taxation
τ optimal fuel tax (new cars) 0.0020 0.0395 0.1292 0.3752
T1 optimal road tax (new cars) 0.0012 0.00113 0.00105 8.8456e-04
T2 optimal road tax (old cars) 0.0012 0.00113 0.00105 8.8456e-04
Mileage of Travel
m1 mileage travel(new cars) 0.0038 0.0037 0.0035 0.0029
m2 mileage travel (old cars) 0.0035 0.0033 0.0031 0.0026
Travel Cost
(pt + τ
1)g1 gasoline cost (new cars) 0.0277 0.0278 0.0279 0.0281
(pt + τ
2)g2 gasoline cost (old cars) 0.0263 0.0264 0.0265 0.0266
T1(aδ) road tax cost (new cars) 2.6564e-05 2.5774e-05 2.4059e-05 2.0343e-05
T2(aδ) road tax cost (old cars) 2.6564e-05 2.5774e-05 2.4059e-05 2.0343e-05
qa vehicle price 1.13533 1.135329 1.135337 1.135342
qaaδ vehicle purchase cost 0.025794 0.025835 0.025923 0.02611
Table 3.A.2: Uniform fuel tax, corresponding road taxes and the economy with
both types of externalities: preference for environment varies
Chapter 4
Optimal Environmental Taxes in
the Presence of Distortionary
Taxes
In this chapter, we derive the optimal environmental tax (gasoline taxes and road
use taxes) structure for vehicles of different vintages in the presence of distortionary
taxes and externalities caused by vehicle driving (pollution and congestion). The
analytical results from our model show the additive property between the Pigovian
element and the efficiency element in the formulation of optimal gasoline taxes and
optimal road taxes. We also show that the optimal environmental taxes depend
on the households’ preferences for environmental quality and congestion externality.
The optimal tax structure is also determined by the degree of complementarity with
common consumption good.
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we derive the optimal environmental tax (gasoline taxes and road
use taxes) structure for vehicles of different vintages (new cars and old cars) in
the presence of distortionary taxes (labour tax, capital income tax and vehicle pur-
chase tax) and externalities caused by vehicle driving (pollution and congestion).
Households own both new cars and old cars, which provide them with driving ser-
vices. However, vehicle driving leads to pollution and congestion externalities which
impose a negative impact on households’ overall happiness level.
Previous literature on optimal environmental taxes focuses on how to apply one
type of environmental tax to address many environmental externalities. Parry and
Small (2005) derive the optimal gasoline tax formula in the second best considering
externalities caused by vehicle driving (pollution, congestion and accidents). Based
on the optimal gasoline tax formulation, their simulation results show that the gaso-
line tax for the U.S. is too low while too high for the U.K. Bovenberg and Goulder
(1996) examines how optimal environmental tax rates deviate from rates implied
by the Pigovian principle in a second-best setting with the presence of other distor-
tionary taxes where environmental tax is applied to ”dirty” intermediate production
inputs. They find that in the presence of distortionary taxes, optimal environmental
tax rates are generally below the rates suggested by the Pigovian principle. In this
chapter, we broaden the analysis to include different environmental taxes (gasoline
taxes and road taxes) to see their interrelation when other distortionary taxes are
present. By doing so, we can examine how the presence of distortionary taxes affect
the structure of optimal environmental taxes.
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We approach the problem by taking the perspectives from both the individual
and the government. Disintegrating the optimal environmental taxes, we find the
additive property between the Pigovian element and efficient element proposed by
Sandmo (1975). The presence of distortionary taxes cause optimal environmental
taxes deviating from the Pigovian standards and the deviation depends on house-
hold’s preference for environmental quality and congestion externality.
To further examine the results of our optimal environmental taxes, we apply
the approach proposed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and look into how opti-
mal tax structure can be explained by complementarity with normal consumption
goods when utility function is not direct additive. The formulation of optimal gaso-
line taxes depends on two opposing factors: the marginal cost of pollution and
the marginal cost of congestion. Whether one factor outweighs the other depends
on both their degree of complementarity with the normal consumption goods and
households’ preference on environmental factors.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 first introduces the decentralized
economy where individual household does not internalize the detrimental effects
caused by vehicle driving to the environment. We then present household’s problem.
Section 4.3 formulates the problem from the government’s perspective (the Ramsey
problem). Section 4.4 presents the optimal tax structure and the implications of the
tax structure are discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 The economy
4.2.1 Assumptions about production
The economy is constituted by two sectors: the general production sector G and
the vehicle production sector F . Both sectors require capital k and labour l as
production inputs.
General production: In this sector, firms hire labour lgt and rent capital k
g
t from
households at the price of rgt and w
g
t to produce consumption goods c, accumulate
capital k, and import gasoline (g1 and g2) at a constant price pt with constant-
return-to-scale technology:
G(kgt , l
g
t ) = ct + kt+1 − (1− k)kt + pt(gt,1 + gt,2). (4.2.1)
The problem facing firms in the general production sector is to choose capital and
labour to maximize profits pigt :
max
kgt ,l
g
t
pigt = G(k
g
t , l
g
t )− rgt kgt − wgt lgt . (4.2.2)
The first-order conditions then read:
Gkgt = r
g
t , (4.2.3)
Glgt = w
g
t . (4.2.4)
Vehicle production: In this sector, firms hire labour lat and rent capital k
a
t to
produce vehicle capital at and fuel efficiency δt:
F (kat , l
a
t ) = at + µδt (4.2.5)
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Vehicle is a type of capital good which is made up of two attributes (a and δ).
a is vehicle capital and δ measures the fuel efficiency level embedded within the
vehicles. Those two components are produced separately but must be sold as a
combined product at the price of qat . Firms in this sector choose labour l
a
t , capital
kat and the optimal combination of atδt to maximize the profits pi
a
t :
max
kat ,l
a
t ,atδt
piat = q
a
t (atδt)− rat kat − wat lat . (4.2.6)
The first-order conditions are:
rat = q
a
t δtFkat , (4.2.7)
wat = q
a
t δtFlat , (4.2.8)
qat [F (k
a
t , l
a
t )− µδt]− µqat δt = 0. (4.2.9)
Equilibrium in production: Market clearing implies:
kat + k
g
t = kt, (4.2.10)
lgt + l
a
t = lt, (4.2.11)
where lt denotes the total labour and kt total capital at time period t.
wat = w
g
t = wt, (4.2.12)
rat = r
g
t = rt. (4.2.13)
4.2.2 Assumptions about the households
Representative household gains utility from general consumption ct, driving ser-
vice Mt, leisure 1 − lt and environment quality Qt. Household gets disutility from
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congestion Nt:
U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt). (4.2.14)
Driving behavior: There are two types of vehicles in the market: new cars and
old cars. We follow Solow et al. (1960b) and Cooley et al. (1997) to model vintage
vehicles using capital heterogeneity as in previous chapters. After production, the
technology embedded in the vehicle will not change, which implies that the mileage
of travel over one unit of gasoline consumed is fixed for the specific vintage type.
Vehicles need one period of configuration and are then used by the households for
two periods before getting scraped. New cars produced at time period t are used by
the households at time period t+ 1. At time period t+ 2, new cars become old cars
and they are also subject to depreciation (1− ρ) from already being used for a time
period.
The mileage of travel produced by both new (mt,1) and old (mt,2) cars constitute
driving service in the following way1:
Mt = (m
σ
t,1 +m
σ
t,2)
1
σ , (4.2.15)
where 0 < σ < 1 and it measures price elasticity of demand.
We further specify the mileage of travel provided by the new cars and the old
1The preferences for mt,1 and mt,2 follow Grossman and Helpman (1991) to guarantee that
household exhibits preference for variety over quantity, which means that household always prefers
to use both types of cars instead of just using new cars.
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cars following Wei (2013):
mt,1 = (at−1δt−1)γgt,1, (4.2.16)
mt,2 = (ρat−2δt−2)γgt,2, (4.2.17)
where 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
Eq.4.2.16 and Eq.4.2.17 show that mileage of travel is linearly related to gasoline
consumed by different vehicles. γ measures the technology embedded in the vehicle
after production.
Congestion: One important byproduct of vehicle driving is congestion. Conges-
tion is normally modelled as the time spent on driving 2. We assume that the average
speed of people spend on driving is an exogenous constant3 (Parry and Small, 2005).
Thus, we could use the sum of mileage as a proxy for congestion Nt.
Nt = mt,1 +mt,2. (4.2.18)
Pollution and environmental quality: Household gains utility from good en-
vironment quality. Gasoline combustion caused by vehicle driving causes pollution
which is mitigated by more fuel-efficient vehicles. Pollution at each period (Pt)
is positively related to gasoline consumption while mitigated by the fuel efficiency
conditions embedded in different vintage vehicles (Selden and Song, 1995):
Pt =
gt,1
δt−1
+
gt,2
ρδt−2
, (4.2.19)
2 See Arnott and Small (1994) and Rouwendal and Verhoef (2006).
3Households do not take account of their own impact on congestion.
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where 0 < ρ < 1 and 1−ρ measures the depreciation to the old cars for having been
used for a period.
Environmental quality is modelled as a type of capital asset. The quality of the
environment, Q represents the stock of natural capital and accumulates based on the
regenerating ability of nature while depreciating due to pollution P . Environmental
quality evolves over time according to the following function based on Bovenberg
and Smulders (1995):
Qt+1 −Qt = R− Qt − Pt, (4.2.20)
where Qmax = Q¯. R represents the original status of the environmental quality and
 measures the nature’s pollutant-assimilating ability. Environmental quality Q can
not explode thus we assume an upper limit Qmax for it.
4.2.3 Household’s problem
Infinitely-lived representative household supplies labour lt and capital kt to firms at
wage rate wt and capital rental price rt, and their income are subject to labour tax
τ lt and capital income tax τ
k
t . It also receives the profits generated from both pro-
duction sectors (pigt and pi
a
t ). Household purchases consumption goods (ct), gasoline
(gt,1, gt,2), new vehicles (atδt) and make investments. Household is also subject to
gasoline taxes (τ 1t for new cars and τ
2
t for old cars), road taxes (T
1
t for new cars and
T 2t for old cars) and vehicle purchase tax (τ
a
t ).
Household maximizes its life-time utility:
max
ct,gt,1,gt,2,atδt,lt
∞∑
s=0
βt+sU(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt), (4.2.21)
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subject to the budget constraint:
piat + pi
g
t + (1− τ lt )wtlt +
[
1− + (1− τ kt )rt
]
At =
(pt+τ
1
t )gt,1+(pt+τ
2
t )gt,2+At+1+ct+(1+τ
a
t )q
a
t (atδt)+Tt,1(at−1δt−1)+Tt,2(at−2δt−2),
(4.2.22)
where At denotes the total assets owned by the household and it consists of capital
kt and government bonds Bt (At = kt +Bt).
The Lagrangian reads:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt) + λt
(
piat + pi
g
t + (1− τ lt )wtlt + [1− k + (1− τ kt )rt]At
− (pt + τ 1t )gt,1 − (pt + τ 2t )gt,2 − At+1 − ct − (1 + τat )qat (atδt)
− Tt,1(at−1δt−1)− Tt,2(at−2δt−2)
)]
.
(4.2.23)
Solving the Lagrangian problem (see Appendix 4.7.1), we get the following first-
order conditions:
U1−lt
Uct
= (1− τ lt )wt, (4.2.24)
Uct−1
βUct
=
[
1− + (1− τ kt )rt
]
, (4.2.25)
∂Ut
∂Mt
∂Mt
∂mt,i
∂mt,i
∂gt,i
Uct
= (pt + τ
i
t ), (4.2.26)
where i = 1, 2.
Eq.4.2.24 and Eq.4.2.26 describe the marginal rate of substitution between leisure,
gasoline consumption and general consumption goods. Eq.4.2.25 determines that
capital rental price.
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4.3 The Ramsey problem
We employ the primal approach which enables us to maximize the social welfare
directly through choices of allocations 4.
The implementability constraint reads can be obtained by rearranging budget
constraint Eq.4.2.225,:
0 = λ−1A0 +
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
U1−ltlt − UMtMt − Uctct − γβUMt+1Mt+1
)
. (4.3.27)
With the implementability constraint, we present the government’s problem: govern-
ment maximizes the social welfare with respect to the resource constraint (Eq.4.2.1).
The Lagrangian reads:
Lg =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt) + Ω˜
(
Ultlt + UMtMt + Uctct + γβUMt+1Mt+1
)
+ Ψt
(
G(kgt , l
g
t )− ct + (1− k)kt − kt+1 − pt(gt,1 + gt,2)
)
+ Φt
(
(1− )Qt +R− Pt −Qt+1
)]
,
(4.3.28)
where Ω˜ and Ψt are Lagrange multipliers. Ω˜ measures the effect of an increase in
tax rate on social utility while Ψt measures the effect of income change on social
utility.
We derive the first-order conditions with respect to consumption ct, labour (l
a
t ,
lt), gasoline consumption (gt,1, gt,2), capital (k
a
t , kt) and environmental quality(Qt)
for the next period6.
4 See Atkinson and Stiglitz (2015).
5The detailed derivation can be found in Appendix 4.7.2.
6The detailed derivation can be found in Appendix 4.7.3.
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Simplifying the first-order conditions with respect to consumption (See Eq.4.A.17)
and labour (See Eq.4.A.18) obtained in the government’s problem, we get:
1 + Ω˜∆ct =
Ψt
Uct
, (4.3.29)
1 + Ω˜∆lt = −
ΨtGlgt
Ult
, (4.3.30)
where
∆ct = 1 +
Uccct
Uct
+
Ulclt
Uct
+ (1 + γ)
UMcMt
Uct
,
∆lt = 1 +
Ulllt
Ult
+
Uclct
Ult
+ (1 + γ)
UMlMt
Ult
.
Then, we divide Eq. 4.3.29 by Eq.4.3.30 to obtain the following:
1 + Ω˜∆ct
1 + Ω˜∆lt
= −Ult
Uct
1
Glgt
.
Using Eq.4.2.24, we get the optimal labour tax rate τ lt :
τ lt = 1−
1 + Ω˜∆ct
1 + Ω˜∆lt
=
Ω˜∆lt − Ω˜∆ct
1 + Ω˜∆lt
. (4.3.31)
In the steady state, consumption c, labour l and driving service M are constant
which means that the Lagrangian multiplier Ψ is constant in the long run. There-
fore, in equilibrium, the first-order condition with respect to capital (See Eq.4.A.19)
becomes:
1 = β(Gkgt + 1− k). (4.3.32)
Combining this result with Eq.4.2.25, the optimal capital tax in the steady state is
zero which is consistent with the results by Ramsey (1928):
τ k = 0. (4.3.33)
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4.4 Optimal environmental taxes
Vehicle driving causes pollution and congestion externalities. Given that vehicle
driving service is generated by two components (transportation capital and gasoline
consumption), the optimal gasoline taxes and the optimal road taxes should reflect
this feature.
Optimal gasoline taxes
Gasoline is used by two types of vehicles which provide driving services to the
household at each time period. Given that the optimal amount of gasoline chosen
by the government depends on the Lagrangian multiplier Φt, we look at the scenario
at the steady state. In the steady state, the first order conditions with respect to
gasoline consumption in the government’s problem become7:
UM(1 + Ω˜∆M)M
1−σm
σ
1
g1
+ UN(1 + Ω˜∆N)
m1
g1
− Φ1
δ
= Ψpt,
UM(1 + Ω˜∆M)M
1−σm
σ
2
g2
+ UN(1 + Ω˜∆N)
m2
g2
− Φ 1
ρδ
= Ψpt.
Given the steady state value of Φ (See Eq.4.A.25), we obtain:
UMM
1−σ
Uc
mσ1
g1
− pt = −UN
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆N)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
m1
g1
+
1
δ
UQ
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆Q)
1 + Ω˜∆M
β
1− β(1− ) ,
UMM
1−σ
Uc
mσ2
g2
− pt = −UN
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆N)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
m2
g2
+
1
ρδ
UQ
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆Q)
1 + Ω˜∆M
β
1− β(1− ) .
7 Firms’ profit maximizing decisions imply that:
Gk
Gl
=
Fka
Fla
.
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Using Eq. 4.2.26, the optimal gasoline taxes in the steady state are expressed
by:
τ 1 = −UN
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆N)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
m1
g1
+
1
δ
UQ
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆Q)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
β
1− β(1− ) , (4.4.34)
τ 2 = −UN
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆N)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
m2
g2
+
1
ρδ
UQ
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆Q)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
β
1− β(1− ) . (4.4.35)
Optimal road taxes
Total mileage of travel (mt,1 + mt,2) is used as a proxy for the congestion. The
mileages of travel by both new cars and old cars depend on the vintages of vehicles
and the amount of gasoline they consumed. atδt is determined in the government’s
resource allocation problem which is described by Eq.4.A.26. Combining this with
Eq.4.A.3 which describes the household’s choice for atδt, we obtain the formulation
for optimal road taxes:
Tt,1 = −UMt
Uct
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
Ω˜∆Mt −
UNt
Uct
∂mt,1
∂(at−1δt−1)
(1 + Ω˜∆Nt) +
Φt
Uct
∂Pt
∂xt−1
∂(at−1δt−1)
∂xt−1
,
(4.4.36)
Tt,2 = −UMt
Uct
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂(at−2δt−2)
Ω˜∆Mt −
UNt
Uct
∂mt,2
∂(at−2δt−2)
(1 + Ω˜∆Nt) +
Φt
Uct
∂Pt
∂xt−2
∂(at−2δt−2)
∂xt−2
,
(4.4.37)
where xt = {kat , lat }.
Optimal vehicle purchase tax
Household is subject to vehicle purchase tax when they buy new vehicles. Following
the derivation of optimal road tax, we use the first order conditions describing
both household’s choice and the government’s choice for atδt (See Eq.4.A.3 and
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Eq.4.A.26), to get 8:
Ψt
Gxt
∂(atδt)
∂xt
= λt(1 + τ
a
t )q
a
t .
To derive the formulation for the optimal vehicle purchase tax τat , we turn to the
household’s problem for firms in the vehicle production sector (see Appendix 4.7.4).
With Eq.4.3.29, we get the expression for the optimal vehicle purchase tax:
τat = Ω˜∆ct . (4.4.38)
We have obtained the the formulas for the optimal taxes (optimal labour tax, optimal
capital income tax, optimal gasoline taxes, optimal road taxes and optimal vehicle
purchase tax). While the expressions do not in general provide an explicit formula
for the optimal tax rate, it does allow us to draw some conclusions about the tax
structure.
4.5 Implications of basic optimal taxes
4.5.1 Optimal labour tax
The formulation of the optimal labour tax is:
τ lt =
Ω˜(∆lt −∆ct)
1 + Ω˜∆lt
,
8where we know that 
∂(aδ)
∂ka =
∂
(
F (ka,la)2/4µ
)
∂ka =
1
µ
F (ka,la)
2 Fka ,
∂(aδ)
∂la =
∂
(
F (ka,la)2/4µ
)
∂la =
1
µ
F (ka,la)
2 Fla .
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where Ω˜ is the Lagrangian multiplier and is positive in the second-best. The optimal
labour tax rate depends on the relation between ∆lt and ∆ct (expressed in Eq.4.3.29
and Eq.4.3.30).
∆ct is the sum of the elasticities of the marginal utility of consumption with
respect to itself, labour and driving service. Similarly, ∆lt is the sum of elasticities
of the marginal utility of labour with respect to itself, consumption and driving
service. From the first-order condition (Eq.4.3.30) we know that the denominator
part of the optimal labour tax is positive. The unknown part is ∆lt − ∆ct . With
Eq.4.3.29 and Eq.4.3.30), we have:
∆lt −∆ct = (
Ulllt
Ult
− Ulclt
Uct
) + (
Uclct
Ult
− Uccct
Uct
) + (1 + γ)(
UMlMt
Ult
− UMcMt
Uct
). (4.5.39)
This formulation suggests a special case which allows us to obtain results which are
easier to be interpreted: direct additive utility function. This implies that Uij = 0
for i 6= j: i.e. ∆lt −∆ct can be written as:
∆lt −∆ct =
Ulllt
Ult
− Uccct
Uct
.
The above equation means that the result depends on the elasticity of marginal
utility of labour and consumption. Moreover, under the assumption that Uii < 0 for
labour and consumption, we know that the expression above always stays positive
which leads to the result that when the utility function is directly additive, the
optimal labour tax rate is always positive.
While the strict additive property for utility function is widely applied, it is ap-
pealing to consider a general case where marginal utility is dependent of each other.
We denote Hki = −UkiiUk and it can be interpreted as the elasticity of marginal utility
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of good k with respect to an increase in good i. We grouped Eq.4.5.39 into three
parts with each one describing the complementarity with respect to different utility
input. For example, in Eq.4.5.39, the first component measures the labour and con-
sumption’s degree of complementarity with labour change. The second component
measures consumption and labour’s degree of complementarity with consumption
and the third measures the driving service and consumption’s degree of complemen-
tarity with driving service. If one is higher than the other, the good can be said to
be more complementary with labour, consumption and driving service respectively.
The first two components are negative while the third on is positive. Therefore, the
optimal labour tax depends on the interaction of the three components.
4.5.2 Optimal environmental taxes
Our interpretation of the optimal environmental tax formulations base largely on
the work done by Sandmo (1975) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972). Sandmo (1975)
proposes that in the presence of distortionary taxes, the optimal environmental
tax is composed of the Pigovian element and the efficiency element. Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1972) look into explaining the optimal tax structure using the degree of
complementarity to the untaxed goods in the economy which, in our case, is general
consumption good.
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Optimal gasoline taxes
As shown in Eq.4.4.34 and Eq.4.4.35, the optimal gasoline taxes for new cars and
old cars in the steady state are expressed as:
τ 1 = −UN
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆N)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
m1
g1
+
1
δ
UQ
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆Q)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
β
1− β(1− ) ,
τ 2 = −UN
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆N)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
m2
g2
+
1
ρδ
UQ
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆Q)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
β
1− β(1− ) .
The expression of optimal gasoline taxes have two components. The first part
represents the correction towards congestion caused by gasoline usage and it is also
proportional to the marginal mileage of travel of gasoline consumption. The second
part depicts the damage towards the environment and it depends on the fuel effi-
ciency condition of the vehicles as new cars are more efficient in mitigating pollution
(see Eq.4.2.19). In the long run, gasoline taxes are decided by the two opposing com-
ponents. New cars provide more mileage which leads to heavier congestion but are
more efficient in mitigating pollution. On the contrary, old cars cause less congestion
but generate more pollutants. In particular:
If we do not consider the congestion externality: the environmental damage
caused by gasoline consumption dominates the optimal gasoline tax rates. As new
cars are more efficient in mitigating pollution than old cars (1
δ
> 1
ρδ
), the optimal
gasoline tax rate is higher for old cars when only pollution externality is considered.
If we do not consider pollution externality: the congestion externality dom-
inates. As new cars provide more mileage of travel provided that the same amount
of gasoline is consumed (m1
g1
> m2
g2
), the optimal gasoline tax rate is higher for new
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cars when only congestion externality is considered.
Given that m1
g1
= (aδ)γ and m2
g2
= (ρaδ)γ, subtracting the optimal gasoline tax
for old cars from the one for new cars gives us:
τ 1 − τ 2 = UN
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆N)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
[(ρaδ)γ − (aδ)γ] + 1
δ
UQ
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆Q)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
(
ρ− 1
ρ
).
In the condition where ρ = 1, we will have uniform gasoline tax (τ 1 = τ 2). From the
first-order conditions obtained in solving the government’s problem (see Eq.4.A.20
and 4.A.21), we know that 1+Ω˜∆N and 1+Ω˜∆M are positive. Under the assumption
that 0 < ρ < 1, whether τ 1 is higher than τ 2 depends on two contradicting powers:
whether the environmental benefit from using new cars outweighs the negativities
from driving too much.
One of the advantages of the model we developed here is that it readily allow us
to decompose the tax formula into what might be called an additivity property (as
proposed by Sandmo (1975)). Rewriting the optimal gasoline taxes (Eq.4.4.34 and
Eq.4.4.35), we can conclude that the optimal tax structure has the following form:
τ 1 = − UN
Uc
m1
g1
+
1
δ
UQ
Uc
β
1− β(1− )
− UN
Uc
m1
g1
Ω˜(∆N −∆M)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
+
1
δ
UQ
Uc
β
1− β(1− )
Ω˜(∆Q −∆M)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
,
(4.5.40)
τ 2 = − UN
Uc
m2
g2
+
1
ρδ
UQ
Uc
β
1− β(1− )
− UN
Uc
m2
g2
Ω˜(∆N −∆M)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
+
1
ρδ
UQ
Uc
β
1− β(1− )
Ω˜(∆Q −∆M)
(1 + Ω˜∆M)
.
(4.5.41)
Equations 4.5.40 and 4.5.41 indicate how the presence of the distortionary taxes
affects the optimal gasoline tax rates. The first part of the expressions states the
special case of a first-best world without the distortionary taxes, where the taxes
compensate the marginal environmental damage (pollution and congestion) caused
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by gasoline consumption. This is the Pigovian tax rate. The second part of the
expressions reveal how the presence of distortionary taxes requires a modification
to the Pigovian principle.
Optimal road taxes
From Eq.4.4.36 and Eq.4.4.37, we look at the optimal road taxes in the steady state:
T1 = −UM
Uc
M1−σ
γmσ1
aδ
Ω˜∆M − UN
Uc
γm1
aδ
(1 + Ω˜∆N) +
Φ
Uc
∂P
∂x
∂(aδ)
∂x
, (4.5.42)
T2 = −UM
Uc
M1−σ
γmσ2
aδ
Ω˜∆M − UN
Uc
γm2
aδ
(1 + Ω˜∆N) +
Φ
Uc
∂P
∂x
∂(aδ)
∂x
. (4.5.43)
We can see that the road taxes depend on two different parts. The first part rep-
resents the driving service provided by owning the vehicles. The second and third
parts denote the negative externalities generated by the vehicles.
Following the previous approach, we rewrite the expressions of the optimal road
taxes as:
T1 = − UN
Uc
γm1
aδ
+
Ψ
Uc
∂P
∂x
∂(aδ)
∂x
+ Ω˜
[
−UM
Uc
M1−σ
γmσ1
aδ
∆M − UN
Uc
∆N
]
,
(4.5.44)
T2 = − UN
Uc
γm2
aδ
+
Ψ
Uc
∂P
∂x
∂(aδ)
∂x
+ Ω˜
[
−UM
Uc
M1−σ
γmσ2
aδ
∆M − UN
Uc
∆N
]
.
(4.5.45)
Similarly, the first part measures the first-best scenario when no distortionary taxes
are present. The second part depicts the impact from distortionary taxes. Looking
at the difference between T1 and T2:
T1 − T2 = UM
Uc
M1−σΩ˜∆M
[
γ(mσ2 −mσ1 )
aδ
]
+
UN
Uc
(1 + Ω˜∆N)
[
γ(m2 −m1)
aδ
]
.
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We will have uniform road taxes (T1 = T2) when new cars and old cars provide the
same mileage of travel (m1 = m2).
Based on the formulation of the optimal gasoline taxes, another conclusion could
be drawn: if congestion is less important to the household than environmental qual-
ity, gasoline tax for old cars will be higher than for new ones (τ 2 > τ 1), which implies
that mileage of travel for new cars will be higher than old cars (m1 > m2). We thus
know that the optimal road tax is higher for old cars than new ones (T2 > T1).
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter examines the optimal environmental tax structure (gasoline taxes and
road taxes) in the presence of distortionary taxes and vehicles of different vintages
in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Our findings contribute to the literature
in several folds. First, we introduce more than one environmental tax to address
different externalities caused by vehicle driving. We show that the optimal envi-
ronmental taxes are related to each other in equilibrium. Second, we find that the
additive property between the Pigovian element and the efficiency element proposed
by Sandmo (1975) is presented in our model. To which direction the presence of
distortionary taxes affect the optimal environmental taxes needs to be investigated
further by numerical analysis. Third, we find that the optimal environmental are
composed of two opposing factors caused by gasoline consumption and the tax rates
are determined by the household’s preferences towards the environmental factors.
We also applied the approach developed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) to illus-
trate the optimal tax formulation using the degree of complementartity to general
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consumption goods.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 First-order conditions to the household’s problem
Solving the maximization problem, we obtain that:
Uct
Uct+1
= β
[
1− + (1− τ kt+1)rt+1
]
, (4.A.1)
∂Ut
∂Mt
∂Mt
∂mt,i
∂mt,i
∂gt,i
= Uct(pt + τ
i
t ), i = 1, 2 (4.A.2)
β
[
∂Ut+1
∂Mt+1
∂Mt+1
∂mt+1,1
∂mt+1,1
∂(atδt)
− λt+1Tt+1,1
]
+ β2
[
∂Ut+2
∂Mt+2
∂Mt+2
∂mt+2,2
∂mt+2,2
∂(atδt)
− λt+2Tt+2,2
]
= λt(1 + τ
a
t )q
a
t ,
(4.A.3)
U1−lt = Uct(1− τ lt )wt. (4.A.4)
4.7.2 Derivation of the implementability constraint
The budget constraint could be rearranged to:
λtkt+1 = λt
[
1− + (1− τ kt )rt
]
kt + λt
[
piat + pi
g
t + (1− τ lt )wtlt
− (pt+ τ 1t )gt,1− (pt+ τ 2t )gt,2− ct− (1+ τat )qat (atδt)−Tt,1(at−1δt−1)−Tt,2(at−2δt−2)
]
.
It can be expressed as:
λtkt+1 = λtRtkt + λt
{
...
}
t
, (4.A.5)
where Rt = [1− + (1− τ kt )rt]. The above expression equals:
βλtkt+1 = λt−1kt + βλt
{
...
}
t
. (4.A.6)
When time goes to infinity, the value of capital should be zero, which gives us:
0 = λ−1k0 +
∞∑
t=0
βtλt
{
...
}
t
. (4.A.7)
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Given that the Lagrangian multiplier equals the marginal utility of consumption and
that profits are zero when the technology for both production sectors are constant-
return-to-scale:
0 = λ−1k0 +
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Uct(1− τ lt )wtlt − Uct(pt + τ 1t )gt,1 − Uct(pt + τ 2t )gt,2 − Uctct
−Uct(1 + τat )qat (atδt)− UctTt,1(at−1δt−1)− UctTt,2(at−2δt−2)
]
.
(4.A.8)
Using the first-order conditions, we substitute the taxes with its corresponding real
terms:
0 = λ−1k0 +
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U1−ltlt −
∂Ut
∂Mt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
gt,1 − ∂Ut
∂Mt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
gt,2 − Uctct
−Uct(1 + τat )qat (atδt)− UctTt,1(at−1δt−1)− UctTt,2(at−2δt−2)
]
.
(4.A.9)
Given that:
Uct(1 + τ
a
t )q
a
t (atδt) = βatδt
∂Ut+1
∂Mt+1
∂Mt+1
∂mt+1,1
∂mt+1,1
∂(atδt)
+ β2atδt
∂Ut+2
∂Mt+2
∂Mt+2
∂mt+2,2
∂mt+2,2
∂(atδt)
−βatδtUct+1Tt+1,1 − β2atδtUct+2Tt+2,2,
(4.A.10)
the three remaining parts in the implementability constraint become:
−[Uct(1 + τat )qat (atδt) + UctTt,1(at−1δt−1) + UctTt,2(at−2δt−2)] =
−
(
βatδt
∂Ut+1
∂Mt+1
∂Mt+1
∂mt+1,1
∂mt+1,1
∂(atδt)
+ β2atδt
∂Ut+2
∂Mt+2
∂Mt+2
∂mt+2,2
∂mt+2,2
∂(atδt)
)
+
[
βatδtUct+1Tt+1,1 + β
2atδtUct+2Tt+2,2 − UctTt,1(at−1δt−1)− UctTt,2(at−2δt−2)
]
.
(4.A.11)
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We then expand the equation above into different time periods:
...
t =0 βa0δ0Uc1T1,1 + β
2a0δ0Uc2T2,2 − Uc0T0,1(a−1δ−1)− Uc0T0,2(a−2δ−2),
t =1 β2a1δ1Uc2T2,1 + β
3a1δ1Uc3T3,2 − βUc1T1,1(a0δ0)− βUc1T1,2(a−1δ−1),
t =2 β3a2δ2Uc3T3,1 + β
4a2δ2Uc4T4,2 − β2Uc2T2,1(a1δ1)− β2Uc2T2,2(a0δ0),
t =3 β4a3δ3Uc4T4,1 + β
5a3δ3Uc5T5,2 − β3Uc3T3,1(a2δ2)− β3Uc3T3,2(a1δ1),
...
which all cancel out when added up over time and thus the implementability con-
straint reads:
0 = λ−1k0 +
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U1−ltlt −
∂Ut
∂Mt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
gt,1 − ∂Ut
∂Mt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
gt,2 − Uctct
−βatδt ∂Ut+1
∂Mt+1
∂Mt+1
∂mt+1,1
∂mt+1,1
∂(atδt)
− β2atδt ∂Ut+2
∂Mt+2
∂Mt+2
∂mt+2,2
∂mt+2,2
∂(atδt)
]
.
(4.A.12)
We can simplify the expression through Eq.4.2.15, Eq.4.2.16 and Eq.4.2.17:
∂Ut
∂Mt
∂Mt
∂mt,1
∂mt,1
∂gt,1
gt,1 +
∂Ut
∂Mt
∂Mt
∂mt,2
∂mt,2
∂gt,2
gt,2 = UMtMt, (4.A.13)
βatδtUMt+1
∂Mt+1
∂mt+1,1
∂mt+1,1
∂(atδt)
= βγUMt+1M
1−σ
t+1 m
σ
t+1,1, (4.A.14)
β2atδtUMt+2
∂Mt+2
∂mt+2,2
∂mt+2,2
∂(atδt)
= β2γUMt+2M
1−σ
t+2 m
σ
t+2,2. (4.A.15)
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We expand the final two expressions (Eq.4.A.14 and 4.A.15) in time:
...
t =0 : βγUM1M
1−σ
1 m
σ
1,1 + β
2γUM2M
1−σ
2 m
σ
2,2,
t =1 : β2γUM2M
1−σ
2 m
σ
2,1 + β
3γUM3M
1−σ
3 m
σ
3,2,
t =2 : β3γUM3M
1−σ
3 m
σ
3,1 + β
4γUM4M
1−σ
4 m
σ
4,2,
...
After summation, we obtain:
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
βatδtUMt+1
∂Mt+1
∂mt+1,1
∂mt+1,1
∂(atδt)
+β2atδtUMt+2
∂Mt+2
∂mt+2,2
∂mt+2,2
∂(atδt)
]
=
∞∑
t=0
γβt+1UMt+1Mt+1.
(4.A.16)
4.7.3 First-order conditions to the government’s problem
Solving the Lagrangian problem, we get:
ct : β
tγΩ˜UMt,ctMt + β
t
[
Uct + Ω˜(Ult,ctlt + UMt,ctMt + Uct,ctct + Uct
)−Ψt] = 0,
(4.A.17)
lt : β
tγΩ˜UMt,ltMt + β
t
[
Ult + Ω˜(Ult + Ult,ltlt + UMt,ltMt + Uct,ltct) + ΨtGlgt
]
= 0,
(4.A.18)
kt : Ψt−1 = βΨt(Gkgt + 1− k). (4.A.19)
Gasoline consumption gt,i are involved in the formulation of mt,i, Nt and Pt, we
express the decision making process in time scale:
t− 1 : βtΩ˜γUMtMt,
t : βt
[
U(ct,Mt, 1− lt, Nt, Qt) + Ω˜(Ultlt + UMtMt + Uctct + γβUMt+1Mt+1)− ΦtPt
]
.
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Therefore, we obtain the first order conditions:
∂Lg
∂Mt
=UMt
{
1 + Ω˜
∆Mt︷ ︸︸ ︷[
(1 + γ) +
(1 + γ)UMMMt
UMt
+
UlM lt
UMt
+
UcMct
UMt
] }
, (4.A.20)
∂Lg
∂Nt
=UNt
{
1 + Ω˜
∆Nt︷ ︸︸ ︷[(1 + γ)UMNMt
UNt
+
UlN lt
UNt
+
UcNct
UNt
] }
, (4.A.21)
∂Lg
∂Pt
=− Φt. (4.A.22)
Thus for i = 1, 2, the first-order conditions with respect to gt,i are:
∂Lg
∂gt,i
= UMt(1 + Ω˜∆Mt)M
1−σ
t m
σ−1
t,i
mt,i
gt,i
+ UNt(1 + Ω˜∆Nt)
mt,i
gt,i
− Φt ∂Pt
∂gt,i
= Ψtpt,
(4.A.23)
where ∂Pt
∂gt,1
= 1
δt−1
and ∂Pt
∂gt,2
= 1
ρδt−2
.
Given that at and δt are functions of k
a
t and δt
9, kat , l
a
t and at affect mt+1,1,
mt+2,2, Pt+1 and Pt+2. To begin with, the first order condition with respect to the
environmental quality Qt is:
∂Lg
∂Qt
= βUQt
[
1 + Ω˜
∆Qt︷ ︸︸ ︷((1 + γ)UMQMt
UQt
+
UlQlt
UQt
+
UcQct
UQt
)]
+βΦt(1− )− Φt−1 = 0.
(4.A.24)
The above expression therefore gives us the steady state value of the Lagrangian
multiplier Φt:
Φ =
βUQ(1 + Ω˜∆Q)
1− β(1− ) . (4.A.25)
9 To produce the optimal amount of atδt, firms solve the maximization problem max δ[F (k
a
t , l
a
t )−
µδ] with respect to δ which gives δ =
F (kat ,l
a
t )
2µ and a =
F (kat ,l
a
t )
2 . Thus we can treat both δt and at
as functions of kat and l
a
t .
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For xt = {kat , lat }:
∂Lg
∂xt
= −ΨtGxt + βUMt+1
{
1 + Ω˜
∆Mt+1︷ ︸︸ ︷[
(1 + γ)(1 +
UMMMt+1
UMt+1
) +
UlM lt+1
UMt+1
+
UcMct+1
UMt+1
]} ∂Mt+1
∂xt
+ β2UMt+2
{
1 + Ω˜
∆Mt+2︷ ︸︸ ︷[
(1 + γ)(1 +
UMMMt+2
UMt+2
) +
UlM lt+2
UMt+2
+
UcMct+2
UMt+2
]} ∂Mt+2
∂xt
+ βUNt+1
{
1 + Ω˜
∆Nt+1︷ ︸︸ ︷[
(1 + γ)
UMNMt+1
UNt+1
+
UlN lt+1
UNt+1
+
UcNct+1
UNt+1
]} ∂Nt+1
∂xt
+ β2UNt+2
{
1 + Ω˜
∆Nt+2︷ ︸︸ ︷[
(1 + γ)
UMNMt+2
UNt+2
+
UlN lt+2
UNt+2
+
UcNct+2
UNt+2
]} ∂Nt+2
∂xt
− βΦt+1∂Pt+1
∂xt
− β2Φt+2∂Pt+2
∂xt
= 0.
And we know that:
∂Mt+1
∂xt
=
∂Mt+1
∂mt+1,1
∂mt+1,1
∂xt
= M1−σt+1 m
σ
t+1,1γ
Fxt
at
,
∂Mt+2
∂xt
=
∂Mt+2
∂mt+2,2
∂mt+2,2
∂xt
= M1−σt+2 m
σ
t+2,2γ
Fxt
at
,
∂Nt+1
∂xt
=γmt+1,1
Fxt
a
,
∂Nt+2
∂xt
=
∂mt+2,2
∂xt
= γmt+2,2
Fxt
a
,
∂Pt+1
∂xt
=− gt+1,1
δ2t
Fxt
2µ
,
∂Pt+2
∂xt
=− gt+2,2
ρδ2t
Fxt
2µ
.
We can then simply the expression for the first order condition with respect to
xt to:
∂Lg
∂xt
= −ΨtGxt + βUMt+1(1 + Ω˜∆Mt+1)
∂Mt+1
∂xt
+ β2UMt+2(1 + Ω˜∆Mt+2)
∂Mt+2
∂xt
+
βUNt+1(1+Ω˜∆Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
∂xt
+β2UNt+2(1+Ω˜∆Nt+2)
∂Nt+2
∂xt
−βΦt+1∂Pt+1
∂xt
−β2Φt+2∂Pt+2
∂xt
= 0.
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We rearrange the above expression using the results we just obtained, we get the
first order condition with respect to xt:
∂Lg
∂xt
= −ΨtGxt
+ β
[
UMt+1(1 + Ω˜∆Mt+1)M
1−σ
t+1 m
σ
t+1,1 + βUMt+2(1 + Ω˜∆Mt+2)M
1−σ
t+2 m
σ
t+2,2
]
γ
Fxt
at
+ β
[
UNt+1(1 + Ω˜∆Nt+1)mt+1,1 + βUNt+2(1 + Ω˜∆Nt+2)mt+2,2
]
γ
Fxt
at
+ βΦt+1
gt+1,1
δt
Fxt
F
+ β2Φt+2
gt+2,2
ρδt
Fxt
F
= 0.
(4.A.26)
4.7.4 Derivation of the optimal vehicle purchase tax
We have showed that the optimal resource allocation for a and δ are: δ =
F (kat ,l
a
t )
2µ
and a =
F (kat ,l
a
t )
2
, thus in the steady state, the profit maximizing problem for firms
can be written as:
max
kat ,l
a
t
qa
µ
(
F (ka, la)
2
)2 − rka − wla. (4.A.27)
The first-order conditions read:
qa
µ
F (ka, la)
2
Fka − r = 0,
qa
µ
F (ka, la)
2
Fla − w = 0.
Therefore, we get the expression for the optimal vehicle purchase tax:
Ψt
Gxt
∂(atδt)
∂xt
= Ψt
Gxt
1
µ
F (ka,la)
2
Fxt
= Ψtq
a Gxt
qa
µ
F (ka,la)
2
Fxt
= Ψtq
a. (4.A.28)
Chapter 5
Conclusions and future works
This thesis explores the relationship between public policies and vehicle driving from
three different aspects: the mechanisms of how public policies affect vehicle driving
and the economy; the optimal environmental tax structure in a first-best scenario;
and how the presence of distortionary taxes affect the optimal environmental tax
structure.
5.1 Conclusions
In Chapter 2, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium infinite-horizon model with
physical capital and vehicles, where vehicles are of two vintages (new and old), and
investigate the impact of two policy options (gasoline taxes and clean technology
subsidies) on driving behavior, vehicle production, fuel consumption, environmen-
tal quality and social welfare. We contribute to the literature in several folds. To
begin with, differently from Parry and Small (2005), we develop a framework where
dynamic relationships are present to capture the long-run nature of pollution and
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capital accumulation. A dynamic model is useful to interpret pollution issues as
those generally accumulate over time and pollution also affects the environmental
quality over time. Secondly, we extend Wei (2013)’s model where she uses vehicle
capital gasoline consumption ratio as the only production input (Leontief production
possibility). Instead, we adopt capital heterogeneity to model vintage vehicles in
that it generates mileages of travel given any amount of gasoline pumped in. Leon-
tief production possibilities thus do not match with this feature. Furthermore, we
offer a novel way of modelling vehicle capital and fuel efficiency. Previous literature
has assumed that all components of vehicle capital are indistinguishably linked to
fuel efficiency. We expand this framework to model two distinct attributes of the
vehicle capital to capture the impact from policies targeting at different aspect of
the production process. We first find that, in terms of driving choices, the house-
holds purchase more fuel for new cars than old cars and households prefer to use
new cars more often than old cars. Our simulation based on the U.S. economy show
that fuel consumption and pollution levels decrease under all the policy options.
However, they have distinctively different distributional impact. Levying gasoline
taxes do not improve the overall fuel efficiency (miles per gallon) of the vehicles
and also change the production side only slightly. It alleviates pollution which in
turn enhances the environmental quality and eventually improves the social welfare.
Providing subsidies to clean technology, instead, leads to more resources being allo-
cated to the production of fuel-efficient and cleaner engines, which results in higher
capital accumulation and labour supply in the vehicle production sector. As sub-
sidy rate increases, social welfare first improves and then plunges when production
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inefficiencies kick in.
In Chapter 3, we derive the optimal steady-state first best environmental tax
structure in the presence of (i) different vintage vehicles (new and old); (ii) pollu-
tion and congestion externalities caused by vehicle driving. We contribute to the
theoretical literature in several ways. First of all, to fully tackle the external cost
generated by vehicle driving, we examine the first best environmental taxes to ad-
dress pollution and congestion externalities separately. Previous literature focused
mainly on using one instrument to address all the externalities caused by vehicle
driving. Our model allows us to capture the interrelation between different envi-
ronmental taxes and see how it affects the optimal tax structure. Analytical results
show that the first best optimal gasoline taxes consist of two opposing parts caused
by gasoline consumption: marginal cost of pollution and marginal cost of conges-
tion. New cars generate less pollution but contribute more to the mileage of travel,
which leads to heavier congestion. Thus, the optimal gasoline taxes for different
types of vehicles depend on the two opposing factors. Optimal road taxes target
at congestion externality which is related to the vehicle fuel efficiency level. In the
steady states, households prefer to drive new cars more often which implies higher
mileage of travel, and therefore the road tax is higher for new cars than old cars. We
further derive the uniform gasoline tax and the formula takes the form of weighted
average of gasoline taxes for new cars and old cars. Second, we calibrate our model
based on the U.S. economy and show that the optimal environmental taxes depend
on the households’ preference for environmental factors. In the presence of conges-
tion externality, optimal gasoline tax for old vehicles is higher than for new vehicles
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when households start to value environment. And that shows the case when the
marginal cost of pollution outweighs the marginal cost of congestion. Households
are better off under optimal fuel tax than uniform fuel tax but not to a substantial
extent.
In Chapter 4, we look into the optimal environmental tax (gasoline taxes and
road taxes) structure for vehicles of different vintages (new cars and old cars) in
the presence of other distortionary taxes and externalities caused by vehicle driv-
ing (pollution and congestion). We extend the literature by looking at different
environmental taxes and how they relate to each other in a second best scenario.
The optimal environmental tax formulas present the additive property between the
Pigovian element and the efficient element proposed by Sandmo (1975). The pres-
ence of distortionary taxes causes the optimal environmental taxes to deviate from
the Pigovian standards and the deviation depends on household’s preference for the
environmental factors. To further examine the results of our optimal environmental
taxes, we apply the approach proposed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and look
into how optimal tax structure can be explained by the degree of complementarity
to normal consumption goods. We also find that the formulation of the optimal en-
vironmental taxes depend on two opposing factors. Optimal gasoline taxes depend
on the marginal cost of pollution and marginal cost of congestion while optimal road
taxes depend on the marginal benefit from owning vehicle and the marginal cost of
externalities from using the vehicles. And whether one factor outweighs the other
depends on utility inputs’ degree of complementarity to the normal consumption
goods.
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5.2 Future works
There are still various aspects relating to the roles of public policies in the regime
of vehicle driving that haven’t been the focuses of this thesis.
First of all, we do not specifically examine the dynamic properties of the policy
impact because we focus more on the long-run changes. The difficulty of examining
the dynamic properties is that vehicles are modelled as a special type of capital
which are different across vintages and last for only two periods of time. Moreover
the focus of our model is to illustrate the long-run impact of the policies rather than
the inter-temporal changes. However, dynamic properties will enable us to see the
short-run impact of policies and how policy shocks would change the economy and
to what extent.
Secondly, we do not allow the households to have the freedom when it comes
to vehicle purchase decision making. At each time of period, we assume that the
households invest in new vehicles of the latest technology and scrape the old ones
after two periods of usage. It would be interesting to develop a heterogeneous
agent model and allow different households to choose from purchasing new vehicles,
keeping using their old ones or scraping old vehicles.
Thirdly, we treat mileage of travel as a type of service and do not model the
time effect into the decision making process for households. Given the fact that
roads have become more congested, time spent on roads is a growing concern for
households. How to model the time effect into the model would be an interesting
extension.
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5.3 Concluding marks
To conclude, the main contribution of this thesis are: (1) providing a thorough
picture on the fundamental mechanisms to explain how different public policies af-
fect vehicle driving, the economy, environment and social welfare; (2) deriving the
optimal environmental tax structure in the first-best scenario and examining the in-
terrelation between optimal environmental taxes; and (3) constructing a theoretical
framework to understand the optimal environmental tax structure in the presence
of other distortionary taxes. The model developed in this thesis could be applied
for most countries where tax and subsidy schemes are possible. In numerical exper-
iments, our calibration is based on the U.S. economy but could be done for other
countries as well. The additional consideration to enrich this thesis include adding
in dynamic properties and allowing households more freedom to vehicle-related de-
cision making. This thesis focuses on the theoretical aspects of public policies and
vehicle driving, we thus leave empirical analysis to future works.
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